Clause 6.4.2 read “ 6.4.2 If the Contractor continues a specified default for seven days from receipt of the notice under clause 6.4.1, the Employer may on, or within 10 days from, the expiry of that seven day period by a further notice to the Contractor terminate the Contractor's employment under this Contract."
Clause 1.4 read:
"Where under this Contract an act is required to be done within a specified period of days after or from
a specified date, the period shall begin immediately after that date. Where the period would include a
day which is a Public Holiday that day shall be excluded."
The court held that in accordance with clause 1.4 but in any event (even without it), the 7 days had to
be clear or whole days after the giving of the warning notice. Any other meaning would either leave the
contractor with less than the already short period of 7 days in which to remedy default and avoid
termination, or, if it depended upon the actual timing of receipt, lead to uncertainty. The second notice
(under clause 6.4.2) could not have been given sooner than 9 September. The adjudicator had reached
the correct conclusion on that issue.
Freezing injunction in adjudication enforcement
John E. Griggs and Sons Limited v High Firs Penthouses Limited [2023] EWHC 2231 (TCC)
The Court refused an application (made without notice) by Griggs for a freezing order, in relation to an
adjudication enforcement claim. The adjudicator had found that Griggs, the contractor, was entitled to
payment from High Firs, the employer, of around £120,000. In the enforcement proceedings, High Firs
consented to judgment being granted against them. They later indicated that they did not intend to pay
the judgment sum and would instead set that sum off against their own claims for defective works.
Griggs now sought to prevent High Firs from selling or disposing of their interest in the final unsold
unit in the development, the subject of the contract works. Griggs argued any such sale or disposal would amount to an unjust dissipation of High Firs’ ‘only valuable asset’, made to frustrate enforcement of the judgment. The court considered that, absent evidence to the contrary, the purpose of High Firs’ attempts to market the property for sale would be to realise its investment in the development, rather than evade the judgment sum. Further, it would not have been ‘just and convenient’ to grant a freezing order, when this may have caused High Firs to lose a sale, and in circumstances whe re Griggs had ‘ample time’ to seek less draconian relief against High Firs such as a charging order. It was noteworthy there was no
evidence before the court as to the manner of sale or market price being asked, nor the amount of any
charges. The court was bound to assume that the sale was taking place openly and for full value.
6
Made with FlippingBook flipbook maker