Arla Foods Ltd v Persons Unknown, 2024 WL 03597159 (2024)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. 117. I have set out above the strong probability of the future disruption to their business absent an injunction, coupled with the effects on others set out above, from future unlawful acts of trespass, public nuisance and interference with the Claimants' right of access to the highway. As Sir Anthony Mann explained in Jockey Club at [18], the threat must be real and 205 21 114. As for section 12(3) , the order does not restrain the 40th Defendant publishing her views. Rather restricts where she may express her views. Therefore, as in Shell UK Oil Products Ltd v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 1215 (QB) , where Johnson J considered the limits of the concept of 'publication' in some detail at [66]-[76], it does not appear to me that section 12(3) is engaged. Further and in any case, (a) this is a final order against the 40th Defendant, so section 12(3) has no application for that reason too, and (b) in any case, in my judgment any interference with "publication" is proportionate and justified for the reasons set out in paragraph 107(4) above. 115. The order sought against the named Defendants is final, so in my judgment no further cross-undertaking in damages should be required. Injunction against newcomers 116. I have considered carefully and applied the requirements in [167] of Wolverhampton , as expanded upon later in the judgment in the way summarised by Sir Anthony Mann in Jockey Club. The relevant newcomers in this case are those persons unknown within the classes set out in the description of the first to sixth defendants. Compelling justification for the remedy a placard, making noise or shouting their message loudly through a loud hailer. Rather the order prevents only real and significant harm caused by unlawful acts. (4) Taken together, I consider that the factors in (2)(a), (c), (d) and (e) and (3) above mean that the past action and similar future action would constitute a public nuisance, and that this is consistent with the 40th Defendant's Article 10 and 11 rights. This was and would in the future be action intended to significantly disrupt Arla's business and the injunction is tailored to prevent that end while allowing future protests within those parameters. 108. I consider that the past actions and the anticipated future actions would also violate the Claimants' rights as adjoining landowners to access the highway. The Claimants were blocked from accessing the highway for a significant period and this would likely be the intended aim of future action. For the reasons set out in relation to public nuisance, in my judgment the Claimants' actions do not constitute a reasonable use of the highway so as to legitimately qualify on the facts the Claimants' rights to access the highway, and this is consistent with the 40th Defendant's Article 10 and 11 rights. 109. Turning to whether it is just and convenient to grant an injunction, I have taken into account the reasons set out in paragraph 107(4) above. 110. Further, future action would cause financial harm to Arla that it would be difficult to redress, given the difficulty in seeking and enforcing effective recompense from the protestors individually. Moreover, climbing onto structures and lorries or entering the highway to stop lorries poses a risk of physical harm to staff or the protestors. The Claimants have taken a number of steps to seek to mitigate the harm, such as investing in future security, but the serious risk of significant future financial loss and the above risk of physical harm remains. 111. Therefore, it would be difficult for the Claimants to undo after the fact harm suffered through future pieces of direct action. 112. For these reasons taken collectively, I consider it just and convenient to grant an injunction in the terms sought. 113. I have considered whether anything in section 12(2) or (3) of the HRA should cause me not to order an injunction. The Claimants properly put this point before me. Section 12 is engaged where the Court is considering whether to grant any relief which might affect the exercise of the ECHR right to freedom of expression. Section 12(2) provides that if the respondent is not present or represented, no such relief should be granted unless the Court is satisfied that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent, or that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. Section 12(3) provides that no such relief is to be granted to restrain publication before trial unless the Court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed. Taking section 12(2) first, I am satisfied that the applicant has done all practicable to notify the respondent, through trying to ascertain her identity and through the alternative service routes.
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