them, thereby imposing a greater strain on the resources of those which had not yet applied for such orders; there was a strong possibility that unless restrained by the injunction those targeted by these proceedings would act in breach of the rights of the relevant local authority; and although aspects of the resulting damage could be repaired, there would nevertheless be significant irreparable damage too. The judge was satisfied that all the necessary ingredients for a quia timet injunction were in place and so it was necessary to carry out an assessment of whether it was proportionate to grant the injunction sought in all the circumstances of the case. She concluded that it was not proportionate to grant the injunction to restrain entry and encampments but that it was proportionate to grant an injunction against fly-tipping and the disposal of waste. 92. The particular questions giving rise to the appeal were relatively narrow (namely whether the judge had fallen into error in finding the order sought was disproportionate, in setting too high a threshold for assessment of the harm caused by trespass and in concluding that the local authority had failed to discharge its public sector equality duty); but the Court of Appeal was also invited and proceeded to give guidance on the broader question of how local authorities ought properly to address the issues raised by applications for such injunctions in the future. The decision is also important because it was the first case involving an injunction in which the Gypsy and Traveller communities were represented before the High Court, and as a result of their success in securing the discharge of the injunction, it was the first case of this kind properly to be argued out at appellate level on the issues of procedural fairness and proportionality. It must also be borne in mind that the decision of the Supreme Court in Cameron was not cited to the Court of Appeal; nor did the Court of Appeal consider the appropriateness as a matter of principle of granting such injunctions. Conversely, there is nothing in Bromley to suggest that final injunctions against unidentified newcomers cannot or should never be granted. 93. As it was, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Coulson LJ, with whom Ryder and Haddon-Cave LJJ agreed, endorsed what he described as the elegant synthesis by Longmore LJ in Ineos (at para 34) of certain essential requirements for the grant of an injunction against persons unknown in a protester case (paras 29-30). He considered it appropriate to add in the present context (that of Travellers and Gypsies), first, that procedural fairness required that a court should be cautious when considering whether to grant an injunction against persons unknown, including Gypsies and Travellers, particularly on a final basis, in circumstances where they were not there to put their side of the case (paras 31-34); and secondly, that the judge had adopted the correct approach in requiring the claimant to show that there was a strong probability of irreparable harm (para 35). The Court of Appeal was also satisfied that in assessing proportionality the judge had properly taken into account seven factors: (a) the wide extent of the relief sought; (b) the fact that the injunction was not aimed specifically at prohibiting anti- social or criminal behaviour, but just entry and occupation; (c) the lack of availability of 94.
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