136. The court buttressed its adoption of the “usual principle” with the observation that it was “consistent with the fundamental principle in Cameron … that a person cannot be made subject to the jurisdiction of the court without having such notice of the proceedings as will enable him to be heard” (ibid). As we have explained, however, there are means of enabling a person who is affected by a final injunction to be heard after the order has been made, as was discussed in Bromley and recognised by the Master of the Rolls in the present case. 137. The court also observed at para 92 that “[a]n interim injunction is temporary relief intended to hold the position until trial”, and that “[o]nce the trial has taken place and the rights of the parties have been determined, the litigation is at an end”. That is an unrealistic view of proceedings of the kind in which newcomer injunctions are generally sought, and an unduly narrow view of the scope of interlocutory injunctions in the modern law, as explained at paras 43-49 above. As we have explained (eg at paras 60 and 73 above), there is scarcely ever a trial in proceedings of the present kind, or even adversarial argument; injunctions, even if expressed as being interim or until further order, remain in place for considerable periods of time, sometimes for years; and the proceedings are not at an end until the injunction is discharged. 138. We are also unpersuaded by the court’s observation that private law remedies are unsuitable “as a means of permanently controlling ongoing public demonstrations by a continually fluctuating body of protesters” (para 93). If that were so, where claimants face the prospect of continuing unlawful disruption of their activities by groups of individuals whose composition changes from time to time, then it seems that the only practical means of obtaining the relief required to vindicate their legal rights would be for them to adopt a rolling programme of applications for interim orders, resulting in litigation without end. That would prioritise formalism over substance, contrary to a basic principle of equity (para 151 below). As we shall explain, there is no overriding reason why the courts cannot devise procedures which enable injunctions to be granted which prohibit unidentified persons from behaving unlawfully, and which enable such persons subsequently to become parties to the proceedings and to seek to have the injunctions varied or discharged. 139. The developing arguments about the propriety of granting injunctions against newcomers, set against the established principles re-emphasised in Fourie v Le Roux and Cameron, and then applied in Canada Goose , have displayed a tendency to place such injunctions in one or other of two silos: interim and final. This has followed through into the framing of the issues for determination in this appeal and has, perhaps in consequence, permeated the parties’ submissions. Thus, it is said by the appellants that the long-established principle that an injunction should be confined to defendants served with the proceedings applies only to final injunctions, which should not therefore be granted against newcomers. Then it is said that since an interim injunction is designed only to hold the ring, pending trial between the parties who have by then been served with the proceedings, its use against newcomers for any other purpose would fall
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