the established quia timet injunction, which depends upon proof that a named defendant has threatened to invade the claimant’s rights. Why, he asked, should it be assumed that, just because one group of Travellers have misbehaved on the subject site while camping there temporarily, the next group to camp there will be other than model campers? 145. Faced with the development by the lower courts of what really is in substance a new type of injunction, and with disagreement among them about whether there is any jurisdiction or principled basis for granting it, it behoves this court to go back to first principles about the means by which the court navigates such uncharted water. Much emphasis was placed in this context upon the wide generality of the words of section 37 of the 1981 Act. This was cited in para 17 above, but it is convenient to recall its terms:
“(1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.
(2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.”
This or a very similar formulation has provided the statutory basis for the grant of injunctions since 1873. But in our view a submission that section 37 tells you all you need to know proves both too much and too little. Too much because, as we have already observed, it is certainly not the case that judges can grant or withhold injunctions purely on their own subjective perception of the justice and convenience of doing so in a particular case. Too little because the statutory formula tells you nothing about the principles which the courts have developed over many years, even centuries, to inform the judge and the parties as to what is likely to be just or convenient. 146. Prior to 1873 both the jurisdiction to grant injunctions and the principles regulating their grant lay in the common law, and specifically in that part of it called equity. It was an equitable remedy. From 1873 onwards the jurisdiction to grant injunctions has been confirmed and restated by statute, but the principles upon which they are granted (or withheld) have remained equitable: see Fourie v Le Roux (paras 16 and 17 above) per Lord Scott of Foscote at para 25. Those principles continue to tell the judge what is just and convenient in any particular case. Furthermore, equitable principles generally provide the answer to the question whether settled principles or practice about the general limits or conditions within which injunctions are granted may properly be adjusted over time. The equitable origin of these principles is beyond doubt, and their continuing vitality as an analytical tool may be seen at work from time to time when changes or developments in the scope of injunctive relief are reviewed: see eg Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd (para 21 above).
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