as a good reason for the grant of an injunction in relation to nearby land which, because it was not yet in the occupation of the defendant Travellers, could not be made the subject of an order for possession. Although the case was not about injunctions against newcomers, and although she was thinking primarily of the better tailoring of the common law remedy, the following observation of Lady Hale at para 25 is resonant:
“The underlying principle is ubi ius, ibi remedium: where there is a right, there should be a remedy to fit the right. The fact that ‘this has never been done before’ is no deterrent to the principled development of the remedy to fit the right, provided that there is proper procedural protection for those against whom the remedy may be granted.”
To the same effect is the dictum of Anderson J (in New Zealand) in Tony Blain Pty Ltd v Splain (para 130 above) at pp 499-500, cited by Sir Andrew Morritt V-C in Bloomsbury at para 14 .
151. The second relevant general equitable principle is that equity looks to the substance rather than the form. As Lord Romilly MR stated in Parkin v Thorold (1852) 16 Beav 59, 66-67:
“Courts of Equity make a distinction in all cases between that which is matter of substance and that which is matter of form; and if it find that by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, it holds it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and thereby defeat the substance.”
That principle assists in the present context for two reasons. The first (discussed above) is that it illuminates the debate about the type of injunction with which the court is concerned, here enabling an escape from the twin silos of final and interim and recognising that injunctions against newcomers are all in substance without notice injunctions . The second is that it enables the court to assess the most suitable means of ensuring that a newcomer has a proper opportunity to be heard without being shackled to any particular procedural means of doing so, such as service of the proceedings. 152. The third general equitable principle is equity’s essential flexibility, as explained at paras 19-22 above. Not only is an injunction always discretionary, but its precise form, and the terms and conditions which may be attached to an injunction (recognised by section 37(2) of the 1981 Act), are highly flexible. This may be illustrated by the lengthy and painstaking development of the search order, from its original form in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd to the much more sophisticated current form annexed to Practice Direction 25A supplementing CPR Part 25 and which may be
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