THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE NICKLIN Approved Judgment
MBR Acres Ltd -v- Free the MBR Beagles
Further, and more substantially, the claim for harassment is not being made by the Managing Director, but by the Claimants. The claim is therefore brought under s.1(1A) Protection from Harassment Act 1997. That means that, at trial, the Claimants must show that the Twentieth Defendant has pursued a course of conduct of two or more persons, which she knows or ought to know involves harassment of those persons, and by which she intends to persuade any person (here, presumably Impex) not to do something that it is entitled or required to do (continue its commercial relationship with the First Claimant) (see Injunction Judgment [50(1)]). Two points arise, even if the conduct of the Twentieth Defendant were ultimately to be found to amount to harassment of the Managing Director. First, that is harassment of only one person. Second, the evidence must demonstrate that the intention of the Twentieth Defendant is to persuade Impex not to continue its relationship with the First Claimant. The Claimants’ evidence on this point, specifically as against the Twentieth Defendant, is weak and relies entirely on inference. As such, at on the evidence available at this stage, my conclusion is that a claim based on these alleged incidents is not likely to succeed. For the same reasons as set out above in respect of the Third Defendant, the fact of the Twentieth Defendant’s arrest on or around 9 August 2022 does not take matters any further.
(d)
(5) The allegation against the Twenty-Fifth Defendant is a single occasion of trespass at the Impex site during a demonstration. That took place in January. There is no evidence of any repetition or of any other activity of the Twenty-Fifth Defendant that could justify an injunction in the terms sought against him/her. Again, this is a claim that can only be maintained by the Claimants based on alleged harassment in contravention of s.1(1A) Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Similar problems arise as in respect of the case against the Twentieth Defendant. 65. There is no evidence against any other named Defendant upon which the Claimants contend, or the Court could conclude, that the relevant Defendant had, in the past, committed any of the acts sought to be prohibited by sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) of the variation application, or credibly threaten to do so in the future. 66. I do not accept Ms Bolton’s submission that the flexibility of “ precautionary relief ” permits the Court to grant injunctions against people in respect of whom the Court is not satisfied that the evidential threshold of actual or threatened wrongdoing has been met. The authorities she has cited do not support such a proposition. To be clear: there is no evidence against the majority of the named Defendants that they have done, or credibly threaten to do, any of the acts that are sought to be restrained by the variation application. Analysed applying the well-established rules as to the grant of interim injunctions, the Claimants have simply failed to demonstrate that there is a serious issue to be tried in respect of the allegations made against these named Defendants. 67. Further, the logical extension of the Claimants’ argument is that it is unnecessary to look at what any individual defendant has done (or threatens to do) and that the Court should instead concentrate on evidence of general wrongdoing by other unidentified
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