THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE NICKLIN Approved Judgment
MBR Acres Ltd -v- McGivern
affect me as a person unknown, if I had known that attached to that injunction that there was an exclusion zone, I must surely have taken a calculated risk, if I had known that, by parking in plain sight within that exclusion zone. It can only have been a calculated risk that a lawyer would have taken if she had known the actual facts. And here I am, this is the implication of somebody knowingly breaching an injunction, in court for contempt with all of my colleagues knowing that. If I lose, I could lose my home. I will lose my reputation. I haven’t slept, I have barely eaten. I might sound coherent, but I am falling apart. That is not a risk I would have knowingly taken, not for any cause in the world, particularly not a cause that I had only been made aware of less than an hour ago. I am not stupid. There are things, as Ms Bolton suggests, respectfully, that I should know as a human being. But on that day, I didn’t know there was an injunction. I would not have breached it. I’ve spent over 30 years as a lawyer within our justice system. I am one of the fiercest fighters and protectors of this system. I think it is the single best defining feature of a civilised society. I talk to people throughout my life about the independence of the judiciary, particularly when you look at the situation in the United States of America. I am so proud to be a lawyer and to have fought for the underdog for 30-plus years. I would not have risked that. Maybe if it’s suggested if this had been my cause for years. Maybe if I have been an animal rights protester for years. I never have been. I should have been, but I haven’t because I wasn’t −− I didn’t know about the plight of these animals on 4 May, and I did not know I had breached that injunction, so help me God.” 86. I have set out that answer in full, not only because I was impressed with it, but because it highlights a fundamental issue: why would Ms McGivern “ risk everything ” by breaching the Injunction. The consequences for her, if found to be in contempt of court, would have been career-ending. Rather faintly, Ms Bolton suggested in cross- examination that Ms McGivern was working on the basis that she would never be identified. I reject that. As Ms McGivern pointed out in her evidence, when this hypothesis was put to her, she had arrived at the scene in her own vehicle. In her closing submissions, Ms Bolton was driven to submit that, in the passage of evidence I have set out above, Ms McGivern was practising an enormous deception; it was all an act. I reject that submission. 87. Before leaving this issue, I need to deal with a submission that Ms Bolton made to me to the effect that I was bound to accept PC Shailes’ evidence, and to reject the evidence of Ms McGivern. This was so because, she argued, Mr Underwood QC had not properly challenged the officer to the effect that he had not shown the injunction to Ms McGivern on his laptop. Ms Bolton’s submission even went so far as to contend that I was bound to find that Ms McGivern was a liar because of this supposed failure in the cross-examination of PC Shailes. In support of this, Ms Bolton relied upon Browne -v- Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 ; Markem Corporation -v- Markem Technologies Ltd [2005] EWCA 267 ; and Abdulrida -v- Al-Najar [2021] EWHC 398 (Ch) . None of these was authority for the startling proposition advanced by Ms Bolton.
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