MR JUSTICE NICKLIN Approved Judgment
MBR Acres Ltd -v- Curtin
application and declared it to be totally without merit. It is necessary, for the purposes of this judgment to recall some of the paragraphs of the Second Contempt Judgment. [94] I have found it very difficult to understand the motive(s) behind the Claimants’ tenacious pursuit of Ms McGivern and the way that the contempt application has been pursued. First there is the delay in commencing the proceedings. Then there is the failure to send any form of letter before action to Ms McGivern giving her the opportunity to give her response. Next, the Claimants’ response to the evidence of Ms McGivern, provided first in a position statement and then in a witness statement, both verified by a statement of truth. The contempt application was pursued in the face of this evidence. The Claimants did so on a somewhat speculative basis relying upon the evidence of PC Shailes (inaccurately trailed first in the email from Mills & Reeve to the Court on 15 July 2022 – see [39] above) and which was only obtained after serving a witness summons, on the eve of the Contempt Application. Finally, the Claimants persisted in a cross-examination of Ms McGivern in which allegations of the utmost seriousness were made suggesting, not only that had she, a solicitor, had deliberately breached a court injunction, but that she had brazenly and repeatedly lied for over a day in the witness box. The evidential support for this line of cross-examination was tissue thin. [95] In his skeleton argument, Mr Underwood QC submitted that the contempt application was an abuse of process. Certainly, allegations were made by some of the unrepresented Defendants that action had been taken against Ms McGivern because she was a lawyer helping some of the protestors. That would be the form of abuse of process by using proceedings for a collateral purpose. I can understand why they might suspect this, but Mr Underwood QC did not put any such suggestion to Ms Pressick when she gave evidence. I am unable to reach a conclusion as to the Claimants’ motives for pursuing Ms McGivern. All I can say is I find them very difficult to understand. [96] In my judgment this contempt application has been wholly frivolous, and it borders on vexatious. The breaches alleged were trivial or wholly technical. Apart from a technical trespass, it is difficult to identify any civil wrong that was committed by Ms McGivern. At worst, obstructing the vehicles for a short period might be regarded as provocative, but there were no aggravating features. As the Claimants must have appreciated, this was not the sort of conduct that the Injunction was ever intended to catch. The Court does not grant injunctions to parties to litigation to be used as a weapon against those perceived to be opponents. At its commencement, this contempt application was based almost entirely upon deemed notice of the terms of the Injunction by operation of the alternative service order. Once Ms McGivern had provided evidence confirmed by a statement of truth that she had no knowledge of the Injunction, the Claimants should have taken stock as to the prospect of success of the contempt application and, particularly, whether there was a real prospect of the Court imposing any sanction for the alleged breaches. Instead of doing so, the Claimants embarked on what proved to be a hopeless attempt to impeach Ms McGivern’s transparently honest evidence by witness summonsing a police officer. This was not a proportionate or even rational way to approach litigation of this seriousness.
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