MR JUSTICE NICKLIN Approved Judgment
MBR Acres Ltd -v- Curtin
noted that it represented the position that was both well-established by earlier authorities and necessary given the parameters of the offence (see [87] above). He rejected the submission that the principle from Ziegler applied to all cases involving protest rights. He held that the answer to whether determination of the proportionality of an interference with Convention-protected protest rights required a fact-specific evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case depended upon the nature and context of the particular statutory provision. Even in relation to other offences that provide for a defence of lawful or reasonable excuse, it did not necessarily mean that the Court is required to carry out an individual proportionality assessment, “ the position is more nuanced than that ”: [53] (and see [58]). 98. It is not necessary to consider the other arguments that Ms Bolton advanced based on Northern Ireland Abortion Services because the case has only tangential relevance to the Claimants’ case against the Defendants in this claim. This case is not about, for example, whether it would be lawful for Cambridgeshire County Council to impose a Public Spaces Protection Order to prohibit certain protest activities in a designated zone around the Wyton Site (c.f. Dulgheriu -v- London Borough of Ealing [2020] 1 WLR 609 ). Nor is this case concerned with alleged offences of obstructing the highway. Even if the Claimants could establish that such an offence had been committed on one or more occasions, that could not be used as the basis for a civil claim against these Defendants. At the stage of liability, the case is about whether the Claimants can demonstrate: (1) that Mr Curtin (and others) have (a) trespassed on the Wyton Site; (b) obstructed access between the Wyton Site and the public highway; and/or (c) obstructed the carriageway in such a way as to cause a public nuisance; (d) (against Mr Curtin alone) that he has pursued a course of conduct involving the harassment; and/or (2) threaten to do one or more of these acts unless restrained by injunction. (4) Harassment 99. The Protection from Harassment Act (“the PfHA”), s.1 provides, so far as material: “(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct — (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. (1A) A person must not pursue a course of conduct — (a) which involves harassment of two or more persons, and (b) which he knows or ought to know involves harassment of those persons, and (c) by which he intends to persuade any person (whether or not one of those mentioned above)—
(i) not to do something that he is entitled or required to do, or (ii) to do something that he is not under any obligation to do.
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