Examples of good practice are highlighted in relevant sections below. Lack of responsiveness, capacity and experience in dealing with the needs of more diverse service users CSO1 commented that asylum seekers and refugees had not been in Northern Ireland in any numbers until relatively recently, meaning that devolved public services had less experience in preparing policy responses. This led to a situation in which approaches were often reactive and ad hoc rather than carefully planned: “… our domestic duty bearers… had not got the infrastructure, or the processes developed in terms of how they discharge their statutory duty in relation to those who were coming here as asylum seekers and refugees… there has been no long term development to respond to the needs of these people” (CSO1). CSO5 noted that responses were improving, although that initial lack of planning and strategic response was still in evidence : “… the reaction amongst education authorities, transport authorities, health authorities, Department for Communities here, just local authorities generally was, ‘this is not our problem… immigration is a reserved matter and it’s not to do with us.’ And so, I mean, that set-up was a real barrier initially to people… we’ve made a lot of progress and some of the institutions have really stepped up… although there are still issues” (CSO5). CSO8 commented that there was a policy lag between changes occurring in society in Northern Ireland and public services’ planning and policy responses : “… Northern Ireland is becoming so diverse, like, quicker than policies and people and services can actually develop and move forward as well… How do you make people adapt and change with more speed?” (CSO8). CSO7 commented that some of the reluctance to change could be ascribed to a deep rooted political conservatism in Northern Ireland: “[There was a] politician on this morning said, ‘we have a different moral compass here in Northern Ireland’. And that moral compass is just an excuse for an attitude, old attitude, a conservatism and kind of, this is still Northern Ireland, this is still like a Protestant state kind of thing” (CSO7). PB5 commented that much policy around dealing with trauma and inclusion was still focused on the legacy of The Troubles, but that needed to shift to deal with new challenges facing Northern Ireland: “… that needs to change in the future. I mean, if you’re dealing with adults and children, young people who display trauma it shouldn’t really matter whether that trauma was caused by conflict and violence here or in Afghanistan, Syria, Africa etcetera” (PB5).
PB5 commented that there was still no “definitive plan” for addressing asylum seeker and refugee issues, with policy remaining largely reactive (“services are constantly working on the backfoot” ) and a growing disparity between the scale of the problem and the resources available to deal with it: “I suppose the main barriers are there’s still the numbers of arrivals and the fact that the resourcing within public service is not matching the arrivals, and it’s still a response to a situation rather than working within a plan to try and get ahead of things. I don’t know, it seems to be that someone’s waiting for this to all stop or not to happen any longer, but the evidence is showing the contrary” (PB5). They described the approach as one of “fire-fighting” rather than addressing structural issues: “… we recognise these medium to long-term structural issues and we report them upwards at partnership meetings. And as a manager I spend most of my time in those meetings reflecting what the frontline staff are saying. But it’s so frustrating that you don’t ever seem to get beyond the fire-fighting ” (PB5). PB6 noted that in the education context it was recognised that there needed to be a change from planning for a largely static population to planning for a population which was becoming more transient. Policies needed to be updated to respond more flexibly than at present: “… when you look at our policies… [they] are almost based on the fact that the child will grow up in this area and they will stay in that area until they reach adulthood and go off to university or off to do their own thing. So, they’re not very adaptable to a transient population” (PB6). That said, commenting on the health and social care area, PB2 pointed that things were generally improving and that the issues facing asylum seekers and refugees were increasingly understood and being addressed: “ There’s nobody could put their hands up and say we have managed to overcome every barrier. We have not. Are we on the right road? Yes. Is it now on the agenda? Yes. Do we have a fair bit to travel? Yes, most definitely. But is it in the discussions that are happening? It is for health and social care, and it is for every trust ” (PB2). Some participants also raised issues with regard to capacity and experience. CSO2 noted concerns with regard to the capacity within the Executive Office to deliver on the asylum and refugee brief: “And as time goes on I’m increasingly less convinced as to their competence… There are good people working there but their only real experience is the Ukraine work” (CSO2). PB2 commented in similar terms: “… in the last two to three years they have provided really positive significant leadership on this issue. I’m not negative towards them; I think that they are all good people who want to do the right thing. I think there’s an experience and a knowledge gap there” (PB2). W2 participants were critical of policymakers more generally suggesting that there were issues in terms of the mindset, knowledge, experience, and cultural competency of public servants that led to issues in fully addressing the needs of asylum seekers and refugees. This was reflected in a practical way by a reluctance to develop cultural competency even by something as simple as trying to pronounce someone’s name properly.
Final report of the of Ombudspersons and the Protection of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (OPRAS) project | 21
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