You can, of course, study a group called “leaders” comprised of the multiple individuals over time and/or space to gain some insight into potential patterns. By so doing, the likely choices that any given leader would make can be explored and the degree to which it will be accepted or fought can also be predicted. Examples for the current pandemic would include examining the past behavior of comparable leaders in place at the time of past pandemics, such as the ”Spanish Flu,” as well as the behavior of leaders in the current crisis that were forced by circumstance to make their decisions earlier in the process. Past behavior of the particular leader or set of leaders with outsized influence over the current pandemic response can also be used as a guide. Nevertheless, the inherent uncertainty of predicting individual behavior for a single person in a unique crisis cannot be avoided completely. Within the conceptual framework and limitations described, both for the virus and for the civic response, we have developed expectations for the future course of the pandemic in the U.S. and the manner in which government and individual citizens will alter their behaviors to mitigate its effects. These are provided as assumptions, not estimates or forecasts. We are not public health or behavioral health experts. We are dependent upon the available information and analyses of such experts to formulate our assumptions. However, making such assumptions cannot be avoided as they will have significant impacts on the forecasts of economic effects and appropriate responses for tribal leaders. While such circumstances are not unique when making any long-range economic forecast, they are particularly challenging for current crisis due to the lack of precedent in recent times. With that understanding, we assume a continuation of significant caseloads and deaths directly attributable to COVID-19 through the Spring of 2021, with fluctuations in intensity by region and nationally including at least one additional peak of comparable severity to the current pattern. We have assumed that the caseload to date reflects 25 to 35 percent of the caseload totals in the U.S. by the end of May 2021 and that the death toll to date reflects 40 to 50 percent of the total at that time. This would equate to an approximate total number of infections of 5.6 million in the U.S. with approximately 224,000 deaths, plus or minus a margin of error. Following that time, we assume that COVID-19 will cease to be a major determining factor in the economy, although the effects of its ravages and of the responses needed to control it will extend far beyond that date, as will be discussed. However, the ongoing caseload and death rate of the virus beyond that time is no longer assumed to be an imminent driver of the economy. This assumption does not mean zero new cases or zero new deaths, nor does it specifically require development of a vaccine or of herd immunity although either or both would be the most positive outcome. The same assumption can be met by sufficient improvements in treatment protocols and disease outcomes and by structural adjustments in the physical plants and personal expectations of the general population.
∴ PROGNOSIS
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