For an acquisition workforce committed to sober analysis, the ancient Persian method of decision-making might seem par- ticularly ill advised. Their protocol was elegant in its simplicity: First, they would deliberate and decide an issue while drunk; then, the following day, while completely sober, they would re- consider the exact same decision. If the conclusion remained the same under both conditions, it was ratified. It’s a system that mitigates the unilateral risk of a bad idea, while maximizing the creative potential of the subconscious.
sight Bias , the common tendency to perceive past events as being far more predictable than they actually were. In this case, as in most, the students will want to know the actual decision, as if it is the rubric for their efforts. For 75 minutes, the class examines the case using the frameworks and tools from previous lessons within the context of Richard Paul and Linda Elder’s Critical Thinking Model. This model asks decision-makers to ex - amine a problem through nine stan- dards: clarity, accuracy, precision, rel- evance, depth, breadth, significance, fairness, and logic. Logic receives particular emphasis. Decision-makers often believe their reasoning is inherently logical despite never formally applying logical struc- tures. They use the term “logical” in defense of an existing inference or preferred point of view without pro- viding valid reasoning, either a sound deductive argument or a robust in- ductive one. Consequently, many professionals spend their careers be- lieving they are critical thinkers sim- ply because their thought process is linear though they often are suscep - tible to standard cognitive biases. Cognitive Bias in Acquisition Cognitive Bias is a systematic de- viation from rational decision-making caused by individual experience, cul - tural or organizational pressures, or efficiency. Though well known, many biases are prevalent in acquisition program offices. The sunk cost bias is a prominent theme in the GCV case study. Individ- uals tend to persist in an endeavor
While the Persian method might have a particular allure, we don’t necessarily recommend it in the War- fighting Acquisition University (WarU) Program Manager’s Course, a seven- week, midcareer course that prepares both military and civilian personnel for their first assignments as program managers. Instead, the course priori- tizes critical thinking and decision making through the Case Method. The Ground Combat Vehicle One pivotal case concerns a dilem- ma faced by Col. Andrew DiMarco dur- ing his first few months as the project manager for the Army’s Ground Com- bat Vehicle (GCV) in August 2010. In this case and prior to the Milestone (MS) A Decision, Army leadership identify discrepancies between the specifications issued to industry as part of the Request for Proposal and the user requirements. They summon Col. DiMarco to the Pentagon to pro- vide a recommendation, and the Case neatly packages the proposed recom- mendation into three Courses of Ac- tion: (1) select a vendor and continue to the MS A Decision; (2) implement minor modifications to the specifica - tions, while proceeding to Milestone A as rapidly as possible; or, (3) stop the Source Selection and delay Milestone A until the requirements are fully rec- onciled. At the conclusion of the class dis- cussion, we ask each program man- ager what their decision is: STOP, SLOW, or GO! Critically, we ask the students what their decision is. They aren’t al- lowed the systematic error of Hind-
JULY – AUGUST 2026 | DEFENSE ACQUISITION MAGAZINE 25
Made with FlippingBook - Online Brochure Maker