EEOC Litigation Review – 2025

judgment, which the court denied. M.P. began her tenure with DAP in September 2007, and became a Supervisor in the Juvenile Special Cases section. However, in July 2017, M.P. began therapy for severe mental health issues, including PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder. Following her diagnosis, DAP approved her medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and subsequently granted her short-term disability benefits. Four months later, M.P. notified DAP of her therapist’s recommendation for a phased return to work and suggesting that she avoid roles that would exacerbate her condition and receiving long-term disability benefits. The EEOC asserted that DAP then terminated her position. While both parties agreed M.P. was disabled and that her termination was an adverse action, at summary judgment, DAP argued that she was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA. Id. at *15. The defendant argued M.P. could not perform her job at the time of termination, while the EEOC contended M.P. could have returned to work with reasonable accommodations. Ultimately, the court ruled that there were unresolved issues regarding whether M.P. sought a reasonable accommodation and whether defendant engaged in a good faith effort to assist her. The EEOC maintained that M.P. could have continued her work if she extended her leave period and be transferred to a new role. DAP countered that M.P. sought indefinite leave, which DAP argued was not a reasonable accommodation and caused an undue hardship under the law. The court further determined that the issue of whether DAP made a good faith effort to assist M.P. should be submitted to a jury. While DAP’s willingness to assist changed after M.P. was approved for long-term disability benefits, a jury could also conclude that granting her indefinite leave would have created an undue hardship for the organization. The EEOC also filed a motion to exclude DAP’s expert testimony under Rule 702; DAP’s expert was a vocational counselor who opined to the basis of the termination decision. Id. at *5. The EEOC argued that this expert would not assist the court’s determination of termination. The court agreed. It ruled that DAP’s expert opinions about the reasonableness of the termination were irrelevant and not based on reliable methods. Id. at *11. The court emphasized that the crucial questions for the jury would focus on M.P.’s qualifications under the ADA and whether DAP had adequately accommodated her needs. The Seventh Circuit upheld a $300,000 award for a former Wal-Mart employee in EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P ., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21705 (7th Cir. 2024). The EEOC filed an action against Wal-Mart after charging party Marlo Spaeth (Spaeth), an employee with Down syndrome, lost her job due to a change in the company’s scheduling policies. Spaeth had been employed as a sales associate for over 15 years, working a noon to 4:00 p.m. shift that accommodated her transportation needs and her difficulty adapting to changes. However, Wal-Mart implemented a new directive restricting managers from manually adjusting employee schedules, leading to Spaeth being assigned a new 1:00 to 5:30 p.m. shift. This change caused significant distress for Spaeth, who struggled to adapt, often leaving work early and accruing attendance infractions. Despite Spaeth and her guardian’s attempts to communicate her difficulties and request a return to her previous schedule, the EEOC asserted that Wal-Mart’s management failed to recognize these requests as a need for accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Spaeth was ultimately discharged after accumulating multiple attendance violations. The jury trial that followed resulted in a verdict for the EEOC, determining that Wal-Mart had failed to accommodate Spaeth’s disability and had unlawfully discharged her. The jury awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages, later reduced to $150,000 due to statutory caps under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. at 788. The district court ordered Spaeth’s reinstatement but denied further injunctive relief aimed at reforming Wal-Mart’s disability accommodation policies, reasoning that the company had shown sufficient compliance with the law. Id. at 786. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury’s findings on liability and damages, affirming that Wal-Mart was aware of Spaeth’s difficulties and had acted with reckless disregard for her rights under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit considered two main avenues by which the jury could determine that Wal-Mart had sufficient awareness, including: (i) either Spaeth or her representatives explicitly communicated the need for a medical accommodation; or (ii) her need was evident given her circumstances. When examining the evidence favorably for the EEOC, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Wal-Mart did have notice. First, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was clear that Wal-Mart recognized Spaeth’s disability, as her Down syndrome was apparent to the store managers. Additionally, it analyzed whether the managers were aware from previous interactions that Spaeth struggled with changes in her work routine, having shown difficulties when new tasks were introduced. Further, the Seventh Circuit noted that when Spaeth’s schedule was changed, she quickly exhibited confusion and distress, frequently clocking out early and missing work without notice. Moreover, Spaeth’s representative communicated directly with Wal-Mart, stating that Spaeth could not handle the new schedule due to her Down syndrome. Wal-Mart asserted that it lacked sufficient notice because no formal medical documentation was presented. However, the Seventh Circuit determined that the jury reasonably concluded that Wal-Mart should

EEOC Litigation Review - 2025

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