EEOC Litigation Review – 2025

multiple defendants, in EEOC v. Tennessee Healthcare Management, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186083 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2024), the EEOC filed an action on behalf of Dr. Dong David Xu, who was allegedly discriminated against on the basis of his age, race, and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Specifically, the EEOC asserted that the defendants, HCA and Tennessee Healthcare Management, denied Dr. Xu a promotion to Division Director of Research because of his race, national origin, and age, and retaliated against him for complaining about discriminatory mistreatment. Id. at *2. HCA filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and the court denied the motion. HCA sought dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that it did not employ Xu, and that the complaint’s factual allegations did not sufficiently establish that it employed Xu as a joint employer or as part of an integrated enterprise. The EEOC pointed to several factual allegations in the complaint to support the theory that HCA and Tennessee Healthcare Management Inc. served as either Xu’s joint employer or acted as an integrated enterprise such that HCA could be liable under Title VII or the ADEA. Id. at *5. HCA asserted that the EEOC’s allegations were threadbare, conclusory allegations. In response, the EEOC stated: (i) the allegations were sufficient to satisfy its pleading burden; (ii) there was a factual basis from records in the EEOC’s custody to plead HCA as an employer in good faith; and (iii) if the pleadings are not sufficient, it should be allowed to amend the complaint. The court opined that the EEOC’s position was somewhat thin and confusing, however, at the motion to dismiss stage, it was satisfied with the allegations of the joint-employer relationship. Accordingly, the court denied HCA’s motion to dismiss. Although the Commission secured several victories joining multiple defendants under the theory of joint liability, the EEOC has also proven successful at selecting which defendants to sue (while omitting others). For example, in EEOC v. Sunnybrook Education Association, IEA-NEA, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11671 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2024), the EEOC filed an action against the Sunnybrook Education Association, IEANEA (the Union), alleging that the Union discriminated against charging party Eugene Johnson, an African-American man, by contesting his salary after he was promoted to head custodian. The Union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the school district should be joined as a necessary party. The court rejected the Union’s argument. It stated that joinder was not necessary under Rule 19(a)(1). The court explained that Rule 19 requires the joinder of parties who are necessary for the court to accord complete relief among the existing parties or whose absence would impair their ability to protect their interests. The court determined that the EEOC’s complaint focused solely on the Union’s actions regarding Johnson’s salary and did not implicate the school district. Therefore, the court rejected the argument that the district needed to be joined for complete relief. The court considered whether the school district claimed an interest related to the subject-matter of the action, and noted the Union’s argument that the district had an interest in the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) regarding custodian job classifications and pay rates. However, the court found that the complaint did not challenge the terms of the CBA itself but rather focused on the Union’s alleged discriminatory enforcement of the CBA. Therefore, the court concluded that the district’s joinder was not necessary. Accordingly, the court denied the Union’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to join the school district as a necessary party under Rule 19. Additionally, the court denied the Union’s motion to stay discovery pending the ruling on the Union’s motion to dismiss. In EEOC v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224466 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2024), the EEOC filed an action on behalf of Melissa Lozano alleging sex discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII. Lozano, who worked as an Accessories Lead/Backup Person in Charge in the Apparel Department at a store reported that a male coworker (referred to as the Male Clerk) began harassing her in May 2021. His behavior included calling her for overrides, following her around the store, wolf-whistling at her, and making comments like calling her "beautiful." Id. at *2. Despite Lozano asking him to stop, the harassment escalated, with the Male Clerk also stalking her outside of work, parking near her car, and following her home. Lozano reported his actions to her managers on June 24, 2021, and made multiple complaints throughout the year. Lozano also alleged that several other women had experienced similar harassment by the same Male Clerk, dating back to 2017. These women, including some who reported incidents had made complaints to management, which resulted in varying degrees of disciplinary actions, including a suspension in March 2021. The Male Clerk was ultimately terminated in December 2021 after making inappropriate comments to a closing manager. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the class action claims, arguing that the claims of other women were time- barred because they were filed too long after the alleged incidents. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that Lozano’s charge provided sufficient notice of the possibility of a class action and that the claims of the other women were not barred, as they were either sufficiently related to Lozano’s timely filed

EEOC Litigation Review - 2025

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