analysis by confirming its denial of the parties’ second joint motion for largely the same reasons that it denied the first joint motion for approval of the consent decree , i.e., namely because of: (i) the parties’ failure to provide the data underlying employment opportunities for Black and Hispanic union members; and (ii) the lack of detailed accounting of the parties’ efforts to achieve proportionate working hours. Id. at *9-10. The court also stated its belief that based on the parties’ recent filings as part of their second joint motion for approval, the data and information in question do not exist. Id. at *10. The court dispatched with the parties’ expert testimony, observing that the expert had only used data after June 19, 2018, despite the fact that his report was meant to analyze a decade-long period from 2009 to 2019. Id. at *11-12. Further, according to the court, the expert witness attempted to use incomplete data from a source other than the union’s own records; however, the expert concluded that even this data contained “critical limitations” and could not provide “any meaningful value” to his report. Id. at *12. Accordingly, the court held that “one year of partial data is not sufficient to justify a conclusion that defendants and contractors no longer discriminate against Black and Hispanic union members and now are committed to providing them with equal employment opportunities. Indeed, this is particularly true given the long and well-documented history of discrimination by defendants, as well as the existence of current evidence suggesting that Black and Hispanic workers still are not receiving the same hours of work as other union members.” Id. at *14. The court was also critical of the parties’ attempt to dispute whether the court’s previous order placed an affirmative obligation on Local 580 to address the hours disparities between its minority and non-minority members, concluding that based on the clear text of the order, the defendants were obligated to work proactively to ensure proportionate employment opportunities for Black and Hispanic members. Id. at *17-18. The court added that it “will not reward defendants for their apparent indifference to minority workers and to the law by entering into a less stringent regime with the aim of winding down any and all supervision in only three years.” Id. at *24. Finally, the court concluded that approval of the proposed consent decree would harm the public interest since the existing orders “can produce the desired results if adequately pursued” and “entry of the Proposed Consent Decree — which would decrease oversight and reduce the obligations imposed upon defendants known to be in violation of Court orders and demonstrably unwilling to eradicate racial disparities — would disserve the public interest.” Id. at *28. This case illustrates the risks employers face when they fail to comply with court-mandated record-keeping requirements in connection with EEOC consent decrees, and the possible longevity of these consent decrees in the event the Court is not satisfied with compliance and enforcement of its orders. 3. EEOC Appellate Cases This past year the Seventh Circuit issued a significant ruling for employers outlining the “severe or pervasive” standard necessary for hostile work environment claims to survive summary judgment. In EEOC v. Village At Hamilton Pointe LLC, 2024 WL 2074326 (7th Cir. May 9, 2024), the EEOC brought claims on behalf of fifty-two African-American employees who were employed by the Village at Hamilton Pointe, LLC and an affiliated entity. Both entities operate a “long-term care facility” that provides “nursing, rehabilitation, and assisted living services.” Id. at *1. Although specific allegations differed as to each claimant, the EEOC generally alleged the existence of a pervasive or severe hostile work environment at Hamilton Pointe. In support of its claims, the EEOC argued that Hamilton Pointe had instituted a racial preference policy. The EEOC introduced evidence that African-American employees were called “racial slurs on multiple occasions” by residents. The EEOC alleged that rather than discouraging such conduct, Hamilton Pointe took steps to facilitate the discrimination. For example, the EEOC introduced evidence that certain shifts would contain instructions, such as “no blacks allowed,” when scheduling employees. On September 20, 2020, the district court entered a partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Hamilton Pointe on fifteen employees’ claims and held as a matter of law that there was no “severe or pervasive harassment because of [the employees’] race.” Id. The EEOC then took another class of plaintiffs’ claims to trial, did not prevail as to most of claimants, and only one was awarded damages by the jury. Id. The EEOC’s appeal of the partial summary judgment grant ensued and led to this decision by the Seventh Circuit. It summarized the state of hostile work environment law and concluded that the EEOC “must show that the alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of his employment.” Id. at *3. And, under the circumstances presented by the case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “the evidence of record does not support, under established principles of law, a case of racial harassment that was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment for any of these claimants.” Id. at *28. To reach its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit needed to distinguish its previous decision in Chaney v. Plainfield , 612
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EEOC Litigation Review - 2025
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