Defense Acquisition magazine Space: DoD's Front Line Bimonthly magazine of the Defense Acquisition University for senior military personnel, civilians, defense contractors, and defense industry professionals in program management and the acquisition, technology and logistics workforce. Defense Acquisition Magazine March-April 2025 Vol LIV | No. 3 | Issue 303
DEFENSE ACQUISITION
A PUBLICATION OF DAU PRESS | dau.edu MARCH–APRIL 2025
China’s “Breathtaking Speed” at Fielding Counterspace Capabilities and more from Space Command’s Gen. Stephen Whiting
Space Operations Chief Gen. B. Chance Saltzman on New Ideas for Quicker Technology Liftoff
Making the Golden Dome for America a reality with OTAs
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06 Interview With
Commander, U.S. Space Command, Gen. Stephen N. Whiting, USSF Emily Ashcom and Benjamin Tyree
Whiting discusses the importance of partnerships and rapid delivery of capa- bility to meet the growing challenges of the space domain. 14 Innovating for Effect— Maintaining Our Technical Advantage in the Space Domain Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, USSF Government must harness the agility of the private sector to drive military in- novation.
20 Nontraditional
Acquisition—Making the Golden Dome for America a Reality Danny Poskey and Kimberly Sulak MDA using Other Transactions to build an effective defense against missile at- tacks.
36 Managing Space Acquisition as a
28 Interview With Space Development Agency’s
Warfighting Capability Stephanie Young, Cynthia R. Cook, Yool Kim, Lauren A. Mayer, Megan McKernan, William Shelton, Éder M. Sousa, Bonnie L. Triezenberg, Jonathan P. Wong The rapidly growing threat posed by U.S. adversaries requires a bold rethinking of space acquisition.
Chief of Contracts, Christopher Glista Emily Ashcom and Benjamin Tyree The keys to SDA’s remarkable speed and success in space acquisition.
42 Bridging Speed and Scale —Integrating Commercial
Space Advances Into Defense Capabilities Lt. Col. Allen J. Varghese, USSF, Deputy Director, Space Portfolio, Defense Innovation Unit Challenges persist in moving from com- mercial prototypes to operational capa- bility.
48 The Future of Space Force Software Acquisitions—
a Case Study in Satellite Communications Lt. Col. Laila S. Barasha, USSF, Maj. Samuel Jung, USSF, and Conrad K. Chong Software acquisition of the Evolved Stra- tegic Satellite Communications Mission Planning demonstrates innovation and industry best practices.
54 So You Think You Can Dance?—Acquisition Perspectives From the Space Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office Matthew Fetrow and Monica Hilbert
Leveraging the right acquisition author- ities, organizational culture and strong partnerships, the Space RCO has mas- tered the balance of cost, schedule, and performance at speed and scale—a del- icate “dance” needed to deliver critical spacepower capabilities for the Service.
35 MDAP
Program Manager Changes
DEFENSE ACQUISITION
VOL LIV
NO. 2, DAU 303
Published by DAU PRESS
Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Steven J. Morani DAU President Bilyana Anderson DAU Chief of Staff Angela Carsten Director, DAU Operations Support Group Dom Dionne Chief, DAU Visual Arts and Press Norene L. Johnson Defense Acquisition Editorial Staff Managing Editor Emily Ashcom Executive Editor, DAU Press Benjamin Tyree Art Director, DAU Press Michael Krukowski
60 From Astronauts to CubeSats, Space Education and Research at NPS Pushes Boundaries Dan Linehan Significant contributions to space research at NPS provide technological solutions for U.S. seapower and national defense. 68 DCMA Support Extends Beyond Earth’s Orbit DCMA Public Affairs Office DoD agency and NASA join trajectories on space- flight procurement. 76 Conferences and Meetings Current conferences and meetings of interest to Defense Acquisition readers. 80 Acquisition News and Highlights Acquisition-related news, press releases, an- nouncements, and more on topics relevant to the acquisition professional.
Assistant Editor Collie J. Johnson Editorial Assistant Susan Muth Production Manager
Art and Graphic Design Nicole Brate Circulation Manager Christopher McGowan Editorial Support Dr. Olena McLaughlin
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INTERVIEW WITH COMMANDER, U.S. SPACE COMMAND, Gen. Stephen N. Whiting, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE
by EMILY ASHCOM and BENJAMIN TYREE
Gen. Stephen Whiting, U.S. Space Command commander, delivers keynote remarks at the Space Force Association’s annual Spacepower Conference in Orlando, Fla., Dec. 11, 2024. Source: Photo by John Ayre
6 | DEFENSE ACQUISITION | March-April 2025
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U .S. Space Force Gen. Stephen N. Whiting is a space operations officer and has commanded the 13th Space Warning Squadron; the 614th Air and Space Operations Center and Joint Space Operations Center; the 21st Space Wing; and the Combined Force Space Component Command and 14th Air Force. His staff assignments have included positions at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force; U.S. Space Com- mand; U.S. Strategic Command; the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group; the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Headquarters, Air Force Space Command; and Headquarters, U.S. Space Force. Prior to his current position, he was the Commander of Space Operations Command. Whiting is a 1989 top distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy with a B.S. in aeronautical engineering. He also is a distinguished graduate of space training at Lowry AFB and the Squadron Officer School at Maxwell AFB. He holds an M.A. in Administrative Sciences from George Washington University, an M.A. in Military Operational Arts and Sciences from the Air Command and Staff College, and an M.A. in Airpower Strategy from the School of Advanced Air and Space Sciences. He attended the program for senior executives in national and international security at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Defense Acquisition magazine editors Emily Ashcom and Benjamin Tyree interviewed Whiting on Nov. 18, 2024.
Q In this new era of strategic competition, how can we ensure that SPACECOM has the capabilities necessary to meet the challenges of a dynamic space domain? A. Emily, for us here at Space Command, that starts by really understanding what capabilities we need. And we do that through a number of mechanisms. But perhaps the two most important are number one, the plans we produce. According to [U.S. Code] Title 10, as a Combatant Commander, my
number one responsibility is to plan for the employment of the Armed Forces. And so, we rigorously plan all the capabilities that we need to execute the defense strategies that we need to put into place. And through that, we can start to derive what the gaps are. The second way that we figure out what capabilities we need is through our exercise and wargaming program. Like all Combatant Commands, we have a tier-one exercise series. And as we go through that, again, we see the gaps we have and the capabilities we need. And then we have a process that converts those gaps into requirements. And there are a number of ways that we can work requirements through the JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] and with the Services. And then also we have other mechanisms like the Inte- grated Priority List, the IPL, where we define what we need in the upcoming POM [Program Objective Memorandum] cycles. And that goes out in advance so the Services and the defense agencies can build to resolve those gaps. And then each year, federal law requires that I issue an UPL, an unfunded priority list, directly to the Congress, highlighting what gaps weren’t addressed in the budget for their consideration and potential funding. So that’s a few mechanisms by which we determine what the capability gaps are and then convert them into actionable documents that can drive the capabilities that we need.
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Q In July 2024, you spoke about SPACECOM’s paramount priority: to optimize combat readiness by 2027 by le- veraging testing, operations, and exercises with partners as critical to operating more effectively. In view of China’s, what you call “breathtaking speed” in fielding counter- space capabilities, are we on that trajectory to match or exceed their capabilities by 2027? A. Yeah. Thank you for the question. You know you quoted me there as using the word “breathtaking.” I’m thinking about updating that word for 2025 to “jaw-dropping.” They just continue to move unbelievably fast in a couple areas. One is building a suite of counter-space weapons that you alluded to in your question. That’s everything from reversible nonkinetic satellite communications jamming, GPS jamming, but it also includes things like high-energy lasers and direct ascent ASAT [anti-satellite] weapons, co-orbital ASAT weapons, and even offensive cyber ca- pabilities. And then the second area where [China is] moving very, very fast is building out that ISR system. And sometimes we call that a C5 ISRT [command, control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, recon- naissance, and targeting] system that is designed to find, fix, track, and, yes, target American and allied terrestrial forces. I have testified before Congress that I believe we are in a window of vulnerability right now relative to China [be- cause] they moved faster into the counter-space weapons than we have. And so, it’s vital for us, and for our acquisi- tion professionals in particular, that the programs that we are funding now to make us more resilient against those threats and to give us capabilities that we need—those must deliver. We need the kit that those programs are going to deliver to allow us to close this window of vul- nerability. And we appreciate the partnership we have with mul- tiple acquisition organizations. I think I could count prob- ably seven that are fielding capability that we need here at U.S. Space Command. Those programs are vital for us to be successful relative to this very significant challenge that we face from the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. Q Speaking of the PRC, in April of this year, INDOPACOM representatives met with their Chinese counterparts at the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group, which allows for discussions about air and maritime operational safety. Does Space Command have a similar engagement with their PRC counterparts? And how well is that going? A. Emily, the short answer is no, we do not have a similar forum. But let me talk about the things that we’re doing because we do care about the safety and stability and sus- tainability of the space domain. So, each and every day a Space Force unit reports up to U.S. Space Command what we call conjunction screen- ing of all active satellites on orbit against all the debris
Q When looking at those capabilities, what do you look to the other Services or other space agencies perhaps to provide to your area of responsibility that the Space Force can’t or maybe shouldn’t provide? A. Let me start by talking about the Space Force, because we have this interesting and unique relationship with them. It’s the only pairing of a Combatant Command and a Ser- vice focused on the exact same domain. They are a vital mission partner to us, and our success is indelibly bound up in their success. And they are our largest force provider, but we do rely on capabilities from each of the other Ser- vices. That starts with the capabilities that they need to implement their Service’s particular mission. So, for example, the United States Navy, as they’re thinking about how their Navy fleet survives under the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] system that, in particular the Chinese have built. Well, that drives a set of requirements for the Navy to have space capabili- ties that help the fleet survive. Much like they have aircraft to help the fleet survive and execute the fleet’s missions. That’s true for the Army. It’s true for the Air Force. It’s true for the Marine Corps. And at U.S. Space Command, we derive benefits from those space capabilities that each of those Services is developing to implement their Service’s missions. And we want to take advantage of that for our missions here as well. The second way I think that we get great benefit from the other Services is they bring us their expertise. So, here at U.S. Space Command I like to say that it’s great for us when about 50 percent of the people that show up to work here, whether military or civilian, have space expertise. Maybe they’re Space Force Guardians, or maybe they’re Army space officers or Navy maritime space officers, or Marine Corps maritime space officers who have that deep expertise on space. But I need the other half of my people to have expertise in joint warfighting, who help us inte- grate space into the Army’s scheme of maneuver or the Air Force’s scheme of maneuver. So it’s that blending of space expertise with what the other Services bring us that really I think is the secret sauce at U.S. Space Command. Defense Acquisition magazine editors interview Gen. Stephen Whiting, USSPACE- COM commander, on Nov. 18, 2024. Source: Photo by Simon Li
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on orbit. And that includes Chinese and Russian satellites and satellites from all other countries. And if we see that those satellites are going to potentially run into a piece of debris, we send out warnings to the owner-operators of those satellites. And you may say, well, “Hey, General Whiting, why does Space Command send those warnings out to China and Russia?” Well, again, because we don’t want their satellites to run into debris and create more debris, which pollutes the very environment in which we have to oper- ate. And that would increase risk to the satellites that we care about, too. Now, that notification process is only as effective as China and Russia make it by registering the right contact information with us, so we can provide that information. I would welcome the opportunity to have a standing routine path to pass space safety information with China. And we’ve seen them try to make some space safety notifica- tions back to us, but it’s not routine, it’s not through a commonly understood path, and it’s certainly not the same volume of the information that we send to them. Q In the list of integrated priorities for SPACECOM that you presented to the Joint Staff, you listed space fires at the top of your list. Can you discuss what space fires are exactly and why they are critical for “establishing space superiority?” A. Fires is one of the joint functions that’s defined in doc- trine, and every domain and every AOR [area of respon- sibility] needs access to the joint functions to be able to operate effectively. Let me just highlight what those seven joint functions are: Fires, which you asked about, Sustain- ment, Intelligence, Movement and Maneuver, Command and Control, Protection, and then Information. Those are all the things that a Joint Force needs to be successful. And as we think about defending American interests in the space domain, we need access to all of those same kinds of capabilities. So, fires is defined in joint doctrine as being the ability to affect or influence some- thing. And so, as we carry out what I call our three moral responsibilities, two of them require the ability to affect or influence. And those three more responsibilities are: Number one, we have to provide space effects to the Joint Force. The Joint Force is sized with the assumption they will have ac- cess to space capabilities like satellite communications, GPS, missile warning, ISR, weather from space. The second moral responsibility is to protect and defend the constella- tions we have today against the threats that we see in the space domain. And to do that, we’ve got to again be able to affect or influence those threats. And then, third, we have to help defend the Joint Force from space-enabled attack. I talked about that ISR or C5 ISRT system that is designed to find, fix, track, and target U.S. and allied terrestrial forces. Well, we’ve got to help the Joint Force defend against that C5 ISRT system. And again, we want to be able to affect or influence that. So that’s the role that fires would play
as a joint function that we need in our domain, just like all other domains do. Q In the near term, what technological developments are the acquisition community providing that will improve SPACECOM’s ability to operate in an increasingly contested space environment? A. I always address technological needs with a great deal of humility. Yes, our gaps inform what those technology needs may be. But I also recognize there are some incred- ibly smart technologists and research and developers out there who are coming up with things that we can’t even conceive of today, that may very well help us. So, this is definitely a technology pull from us, but I also need a tech- nology push from those who are on the cutting edge be- cause, 15 years ago, if we had been talking, who could have ever believed that we would be having reusable rockets landing? That seemed like sci-fi. Now, of course, it’s just something we take for granted. But to answer your question, I would point to three classes of technologies that we would find very helpful here at U.S. Space Command. One is technologies that would enable what we call sustained space maneuver or dynamic space operations. Now you may say, “Hey Whit- ing, everything in space is moving.” And it’s true. In low- Earth orbit, objects in orbit are moving 17,000 miles an hour. But they’re in energy neutral states and, in fact, to literally move them out of that energy neutral state re- quires a lot of fuel, a lot of energy. And so, every time we want to move a satellite, we are debating with ourselves, A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket booster carrying a payload of two WorldView Legion satellites launches from Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., May 2, 2024. This launch marked a collaboration between the U.S. Space Forces – Space and Maxar Technologies, a commercial space company. This mission was supported by U.S. Space Forces - Space (S4S) Commercial Integration Cell program, which fosters collaboration between the DoD and commercial space companies to deliver criti- cal space capabilities. Source: U.S. Space Force photo by Senior Airman Joshua Leroi
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I believe we are in a window of vulnerability right now relative to China [because] they moved faster into the counter-space weapons than we have. And so, it’s vital for us, and for our acquisition professionals in particular, that the programs that we are funding now to make us more resilient against those threats and to give us capabilities that we need —those must deliver.
“Do we want to expend the limited fuel that that satellite was launched with in order to move it?” We want to be able to drive a satellite around to execute the missions we need, just like you would drive a tank or a ship or an aircraft. But today we’re very limited. And so, we want to think about on-orbit refueling, for example, where we can maneuver that satellite without regret be- cause we know we can get back to a refueling point. Or different kinds of propulsion techniques that would allow us to move across orbital regimes. Today, if we launch something into low-Earth orbit, there’s no way you can get to geosynchronous orbit or vice versa, and we would love to have capabilities that can maneuver between all the orbital regimes. So that’s one bucket of technology classes that we need. The second would be artificial intelligence and machine learning [AI/ML]. Some of our mission areas are very data rich, such as space domain awareness. That’s what we call tracking the 46,000 objects that are on orbit. And, by the way, that number has grown almost 90 percent since Space Command was created just over five years ago. How do we use AI/ML to keep custody of the real objects of concern? We’ve made some progress there, but there’s a lot more we could do. And then the third area would also be cyber defenses. Cyber is the soft underbelly of our space enterprise be- cause, yes, given the threats I highlighted a moment ago, countries can take us on in the domain with things like direct ascent ASAT weapons, but they would rather attack us through cyber because it’s cheaper for them and harder for us to attribute. We still have work to do to harden our cyber defenses so that these global networks that extend out to geosynchronous orbit and beyond are secure from potential cyberattacks. There’s a lot more we could poten- tially talk about regarding technology needs, but those are three I would highlight. Q Shifting gears a little bit, what do you see as SPACE- COM’s priorities in terms of bolstering international and commercial partnerships? A. We like to say that space is a team sport, and by that we mean that no one Command, Service, agency, department,
company, or country can do all that needs to be done in space. So, we have to have these robust partnerships with commercial and international actors as you noted. We actually have various tiers at which we can partner with international organizations and countries and com- mercial agencies. And based on their level of maturity and how robust our relationship is, we can increase that amount of partnership. For international partners, the high- est level of partnership that we have is something called Operation Olympic Defender. This is a named operation that the United States leads with our closest allies in space. And we are working together each and every day in space to ensure that we all can maintain custody of all those objects that I talked about earlier, but also to under- stand the threats that are there and to drive down risks to each of our countries. We just brought on two new coun- tries in the last month or so. France and Germany have now joined the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. And New Zealand is in the process of joining, following their public acceptance of their member- ship invitation in September 2024. So we want to continue to drive that forward and operationalize that for the benefit of all of our countries. On the commercial side, there are multiple ways that we take advantage of our relationships with commercial companies, but at the top of that pyramid would be our Commercial Integration Cell. We as the Department of Defense, or the intelligence community, contract with 15 companies for services—things like satellite communica- tions, launch services, or intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance from space. It’s our job at U.S. Space Command to share threat information at the classified level with these companies so that they know what the threats are in the domain in which they’re operating. And then, conversely, they give us insights into what’s happening to their constellations. There have been instances where the first time we’ve been aware of electromagnetic interference, for example, that is propagating into the domain from the surface of the Earth, comes from one of those companies letting us know. So it’s a wonderful two-way exchange of information that helps us all to operate more effectively in space.
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Q Are there any risks or concerns with relying on the commercial sector for supplying capabilities? A. Yeah, it’s a great question, and it’s a question that other Commands and other domains have to wrestle with. For example, I know you’re aware that U.S. Transportation Command through a process called CRAFT, the Civil Re- serve Air Fleet, relies on commercial air carriers to help support some of the bulk movement of personnel and equipment to various theaters of operation. And there’s something similar with Sealift as well. So, we can apply some of those lessons learned into this domain, and in fact, the Office of the Secretary of Defense this past year put forward a commercial integration strategy that talks about this balance—that, yes, for some requirements, commer- cial works fantastic. But there certainly are missions where we want be- spoke-built capabilities that the government controls be- cause those missions are of such importance to us. Missile warning systems that support the president for nuclear command and control, for example—those flow over the satellite constellations that we’ve paid commercial in- dustry to build for us, that we own, that we control. And we have built them perhaps to higher specifications than would be built just for commercial applications. So, it’s a balance. And we’ve got to look at all of those requirements and then pick the best capability for each mission area.
Q SPACECOM’s Strategic Vision speaks of the impor- tance of leading as a model of responsible behavior in space. And you’ve also spoken about the importance of keeping space safe for humanity and the sciences. What does responsible behavior in space look like now and in the future? A. Ben, thanks for that question. There is some interna- tional law on this that highlights what professional, re- sponsible safe behavior would be and that most of the international community has signed up to. For example, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 says that countries will not place weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons on orbit. Of course, the United States is a signatory to that, Russia is a signatory to that, China, and other spacefaring nations. And yet, now we see reports that Russia might be con- sidering placing a nuclear armed anti-satellite weapon in orbit. Of course, that would be incredibly irresponsible be- havior with indiscriminate effects that would affect every country’s satellites and affect our way of life here on planet Earth. So, it’s important that the Russians understand that we expect them to abide by the treaty obligations that they have, which have been around now for 57 years. Here in the United States, the Secretary of Defense a few years ago signed out a memo which lays out the tenets of responsible behavior. And that sounds maybe soft, that these are tenets, but they’re a direction to me and to all
Russell Vela, chief of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s Multi-Domain Technologies Division briefs Gen. Stephen N. Whiting, commander of U.S. Space Com- mand, on the USASMDC SPECTRE transportable distributed aperture research system. Whiting visited USASMDC on Feb. 12, 2025 to meet team members and learn how their missions support Space Command. Source: U.S. Army photo by Jason B. Cutshaw
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DoD organizations. We must follow these. Number one of these tenets of responsible behavior is to operate in, from, and through space with due regard to others and in a responsible manner. Number two, limit the generation of long-lived debris. Number three, avoid the creation of harmful interference. Number four, maintain safe separation and safe trajectory when you are maneu- vering satellites near each other. And then, five, communi- cate and make notifications to enhance safety and stability of the domain. And to Emily’s previous question, we send out these safety notifications because we want to com- municate and make notifications to enhance safety. That’s why we do that, for the international community. Looking to the future, operations around the moon are coming back, you know. In the next couple of years, NASA, through the Artemis program, is going to put Americans back on the lunar surface. And there may be a need for military operations in cislunar orbit or ex-geo orbit, as we call that. And I think there’s going to be a discussion at that point. What do you do with satellites that will go defunct in lunar orbit? Today if we have a satellite that is going to be defunct in low-Earth orbit, we tend to burn it back into the atmosphere, so we don’t leave it in space. If it’s in geosynchronous orbit, we put it in a parking lot orbit which is above geosynchronous and a safe place to get it out of geosynchronous orbit. We call it the graveyard belt. But what do you do with objects in cislunar? Maybe we all can agree to put objects in a safe location away from the orbits that active satellites need to be in. Or maybe we’ll get to an ethos that every bit of kit that you take you have to bring back out with you. You know, we live here in Colorado and when you go into these pristine mountains, that’s an ethos that a lot of hikers have: Whatever you pack in, you have to pack out. I think that’s a discussion that we’re going to have in the future: What do you do with debris in some of these nontraditional orbits? Q You spoke at a space symposium earlier this year on the importance of alliances and including academic alliances. As you probably know, DAU offers space acqui- sition courses and has a SPACECOM liaison. What do you feel that the acquisition and training community needs to focus on and prioritize? A. Emily, this is another question I’ll approach with a great deal of humility because I am not an acquisition expert. And so, I wade carefully into telling the acquisition com- munity what to do. But I’ll tell you what I need . And I think this is what the acquisition community can help with. Again, we need to really keep working to crack the code on rapid delivery of capability. Doing things in space is rocket science. It’s hard, and you know, one of our taglines is space is hard. And it’s not just delivering the thing . It’s delivering the full DOTmLPF [doctrine, organization, train- ing, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and fa- cilities] of capability. It’s training systems. It’s personnel. It’s bringing together the civil engineers who have to build
[W]e need to really keep working to crack the code on rapid delivery of capability. Doing things in space is rocket science. It’s hard, and you know, one of our taglines is space is hard. And it’s not just delivering the thing . It’s delivering the full DOTmLPF [doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities] of capability.
the facilities that these systems have to be operated from. It’s bringing all that together rapidly, so we get capability. And then on the training side, I would highlight the need for the acquisition community to understand space. I’m thrilled to hear that you’re bringing on space acquisition courses, but it’s also that the space community under- stands acquisition . At U.S. Space Command, we don’t have any unique ac- quisition authorities, and I don’t think I need those. But I think I can perform a unique integration role across the seven organizations that I mentioned earlier that deliver capability to us. We can look across all those to say, “Are all the various capabilities coming together in a way that allows us to close our kill chains and interdict potential adversaries’ kill chains?” Q Yeah, definitely. Is there anything we didn’t cover that you wanted to add? A. Just my thanks for what you and DAU do to help prepare the acquisition workforce that we need. This is a tough business, and we don’t have all the resources we need to get after every mission. So, we’ve got to find ways to be not only effective, but to be efficient and to make sure that we’re delivering the capability that the Warfighters need, [not only] here at U.S. Space Command, but across all the Combatant Commands as well as doing right by the tax- payer. So, I appreciate all the DAU does to help us do that.
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Innovating for Effect— MAINTAINING OUR TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE IN THE SPACE DOMAIN by GEN. B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, USSF
S pace is unforgiving. It is hard on the human body. It is hard on equipment. With space now a warfighting domain, that puts tremendous pressure on the defense acquisition process to supply and sustain credible military space capabilities. If the United States intends to remain the world’s preeminent space power, we must fundamentally change the way we conceive, develop, and deploy novel technology for a rapidly evolving environment. “New truths begin as heresies…” —Art Kleiner
tomatic Maxim machine guns. Again, defense rose to prominence. Across the centuries, offense and defense alternate in their dominance, and any given status quo holds only for as long as it takes for a new idea to subsume existing ones. In the newest warfighting do- main—outer space—the current para- digm is offense-dominated. Protect- ing satellites from the range of threats arrayed against them is incredibly difficult, so we employ a proliferated architecture to mitigate the risk. We
build defense in depth and prioritize resiliency, and we align investments accordingly to achieve military objec- tives within the status quo. This is a precarious position, though, because we are building space forces that may be wholly inadequate for the future operating environment. Yes, present circumstances will continue until such time as someone innovates a new paradigm, but it is far more beneficial to be the innovator driving that shift than an observer forced to react to it.
Once upon a time, castle walls were the final word in strategic advantage, and defense was pre- eminent. Then came siege engines, which overcame stone defenses to strike at the vulnerable targets they protected. Suddenly, offense became the new orthodoxy. In World War I, armies that clung to cavalry charges and infantry marching abreast proved obsolete in the face of emplaced au-
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Fuerza Aérea Colombiana, the Colombian air force, leveraged commercial satellite imagery provided through the U.S. Space Force’s Tactics Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Tracking (TacSRT) program to direct firefighting teams in Columbia in January 2024. Source: U.S. Space Force Courtesy Photo This photo was cropped to show detail. This image was edited using multiple filters and dodging and burning techniques.
As the pace of technological ad- vancement increases, harnessing the power of innovation has never been more important. Consider the Russian invasion of Ukraine, where both sides have demonstrated rapid develop- ment of novel tactics and equipment. Battlefield solutions identified tonight are implemented tomorrow because the alternative is death. Nothing is more clarifying for military forces than combat feedback. In search of strategic advantage, the side that innovates and adapts most effec- tively lives longest. There is just one problem, though. Government organizations are bad at innovation. “A heretic is someone who sees a truth that contradicts the conventional wisdom of the institution…” —Art Kleiner
I have served in government for over 30 years. I climbed the ranks from second lieutenant to general, and I am the chief of the most technologi- cally advanced military service in the world. So, believe me when I say this: Government organizations are funda- mentally not structured to innovate. Their processes are not built for it; they are not equipped for it; and, even
Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman delivers a keynote address on the state of the U.S. Space Force during the Air and Space Forces Asso- ciation 2024 Warfare Symposium in Aurora, Colo., Feb. 13, 2024. Source: U.S. Space Force photo by Eric Dietrich
Nothing is more clarifying for military forces than combat feedback. In search of strategic advantage, the side that innovates and adapts most effectively lives longest.
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Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman speaks during the Guardian Field Forum at Joint Base Andrews, Md., March 15, 2024. The forum is a weeklong event that brings together junior Guardians and senior Space Force leaders to collaborate on initiatives to improve the Space Force. Source: U.S. Space Force photo by Eric Dietrich
if they could be, external pressure— albeit unintendedly—prevents it. Government organizations are bureaucracies. They operate at the will of the people with public money, and they bear responsibility for policy implementation and responsible dis- position of resources. They cannot be- have as entrepreneurs. They are not permitted to make overly risky bets. They are criticized when they gamble with the welfare of their constituents. The pressure on a government organi- zation is overwhelmingly to maintain the status quo, not to disrupt it. Even if a government were able to diverge from its nature and pursue real innovation, time remains a pow- erful barrier. Government bureaucra- cies are not nimble. By design, they distribute power and establish layers of oversight. So, if a company demon- strates a game-changing technology that we want today, it will take two years to secure funds through the fed- eral budgeting process and another year to align contractual vehicles. By the time we are ready to invest in that new idea, much less field it, the con-
cept will most likely have lost its nov- elty and very possibly its relevance. As such, governments traditionally prefer new–old ideas: taking some- thing that exists and making it mar- ginally better. There are good reasons for this. If you are doing something fa- miliar, then the necessary resources, processes, and institutions will al- ready be largely in place. Industrial support will be available. There will be existing concepts and expertise upon which to build. From a man- agement perspective, new–old ideas gather strong support. They affirm our standard ways of doing business, there are fewer unknowns to account for, and they seem like a low-risk way to enhance capability. Putting a new spin on an old idea allows you to leverage all the things that made the old idea possible but also constrains you to the boundaries of the status quo. New–new ideas offer an altogether different prospect. Because they break the status quo, the processes and institutions required to make them possible either will not exist or will be
ill-suited in their present forms. Tech- nical maturity will be low. Concepts will be notional at best. There might not be any practical experience upon which to build. Culturally, new–new ideas are rife with uncertainty. The government “system” will see them as risky, irresponsible, dangerous, and “not the way we do business.” Innovation is not just process im- provement. New–old ideas are im- portant and necessary but are not innovative. If we want to drive mate- rial change—if we want to seize the initiative on the battlefield—then we must learn to harness new–new ideas. “…and remains loyal to both entities—to the institution and the new truth.” —Art Kleiner To design and field the new–new capabilities that drive innovation, we must abandon our Industrial Age mindset with its predetermined con- cepts, requirements, and risk toler- ances. If we want to act differently, it starts with thinking differently.
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For government leaders, this means a fundamental change in the way we work with private enterprise. Industry faces different constraints than government organizations. While companies are answerable to public shareholders or private inves- tors, they can be more agile and en- trepreneurial. They can more quickly integrate new technological develop- ment from across the commercial enterprise into their work. They have the expertise to produce at scale and move quickly—something the govern- ment struggles to do. That said, government organiza- tions have unique strengths. They have vast understanding of the threat, and they own the mission. They have well-understood operational needs that endure for decades. They are not competitors with private enterprises, and they can contribute to basic re- search. So, while government orga- nizations are not built to innovate, they must be sophisticated in both spurring and consuming innovation. Therefore, our best solution is to foster enhanced partnerships with a quick feedback loop between govern- ment and industry that capitalizes on our respective strengths to accelerate the uptake of new–new ideas.
The first and most essential step to leading innovation is to resist the urge to use “tried and true” processes. If you do what you have always done, you should not expect new results. We have to recognize the ways in which our usual practices restrain us. Do not start with a detailed concept of operations—it will be anchored to existing thought, processes, struc- tures, and capabilities. Do not start with overly detailed requirements— they will stifle options. Do not start with a risk assessment—it will skew toward the knowns and inflate the risk of uncertainty. Instead, we must develop and mechanize a process for identifying, implementing, and iterating ideas in miniature. “Complex systems that work” evolve from “simple systems that work.” Start small. Find a way to harness a new idea in a limited way, prove it works, and scale from there. The system of government bureau- cracy is a powerful one. You cannot fight it on every front, but you can test its assumptions. If we can bring a new–new idea into the system and demonstrate its value, the idea be- comes more familiar, and we can start to leverage the power of the system to implement innovation rather than to reject it.
Moreover, we must learn to think horizontally, not vertically. Many great ideas fail to take root because they lack support, and they wither on the vine. It is not enough to trial an innovation within a single use-case for a narrow objective—you must prove broad applicability to win general sup- port and tilt the cost-benefit equation in favor of innovation. The ideas that drove the Industrial Revolution were not constrained just to textiles or me- talworking—they influenced every as- pect of society from transportation to communication to societal structures. In the same way, we should not overcommit resources to develop- ing an exquisite artificial intelligence for real-time change detection in the 490–575 nanometer band from low- Earth orbit. Instead, we should explore artificial intelligence more broadly for the enhancement of human decision- making. An idea that applies across many contexts and can be tailored to various purposes is an idea that can inspire real change. We cannot con- trol the outcome, but we can man- age conditions to make innovation more likely. So, it is incumbent on us as lead- ers to lift our heads above the parapet and make connections with coun- terparts in other mission areas and sectors. We must talk across agen- cies and be willing to share and col- laborate. Money is always a finite re- source, and time is doubly so. We can be so much more effective when we pool our limited resources in pursuit of common gain. In May 2024, the Space Force al- located $40 million for commercial space services. Specifically, we es- tablished a pilot program—Tactical Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Tracking (TacSRT)—to create a mar- ketplace for commercial analytics and data fusion in Earth observation data. This was a first-of-its-kind initiative meant to complement the exquisite work of the Intelligence Community with unclassified operational planning products delivered on tactical relevant timelines. We did not start with a
U.S. Air Force air advisors assigned to the 409th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron brief the Niger Armed Forces, also known as Forces Armées Nigeriennes (FAN), before training exercises at the FAN compound on Nigerien Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger, July 10, 2019. The FAN learned how to efficiently and safely clear buildings. Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer
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validated requirement, nor were we able to guarantee results. We simply recognized the rapid development of a powerful industrial capability, and we set out to explore its utility. After all, leveraging nongovernment satel- lites for direct military benefit was a new–new idea, and it faced significant criticism. In other words, the “system” pushed back hard against this idea that went against the status quo. To date, through our Service com- ponent to AFRICOM—the Combatant Command responsible for the African continent—the TacSRT program has provided more than 50 products that positively influenced operations on the ground. It analyzed suspicious ac- tivities by violent extremists along the border of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It offered visual insights to the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Kenya to support humani- tarian assistance and disaster relief during major flooding in May 2024. Most critically of all, it supported U.S. forces as they completed their with- drawal from Air Base 201 in Niger last August. Through TacSRT, the Space Force maintained overwatch of every- thing within 5 kilometers of the base, enabling force protection from space for the first time. TacSRT is a simple system that works. Now, we are expanding horizon- tally. More Combatant Commands are asking for TacSRT support, and we are determining how to scale the pro- gram to support them. We have taken a new–new idea, proved the system can accommodate it, and are making the machine work for us. It is an ini- tial step toward a new world of hybrid space operations, leveraging military and commercial assets for battlefield effect and creating a direct pipeline from industry to Warfighter. This is real innovation, and it is the kind of thing we are continuing to drive in the Space Force. Innovation has never been more critical to government, and it is vitally important for government leaders to determine how to harness it. We do not yet have the structure, policies,
Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force, briefs the AY 25 class of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Sept. 27, 2024. Gen. Saltzman spoke on the strategic environment of space. Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Trey Ward
or culture required to innovate within the bureaucracy, but we can partner with those who can do what we can- not. In the process, we have to be clear about what is innovation and what is not: what is new–new rather than just new–old. When we iden- tify a promising new technology, we must work within the system to intro- duce and scale new–new ideas with- out triggering institutional barriers. Governments may not be designed for innovation, but they absolutely must lead innovation to thrive in an accelerating world. Whenever a national interest is found, competition, crisis, and conflict are sure to follow. As the backbone of both our national security and our prosperity, space has emerged as a critical U.S. interest, and our adversar- ies are ready and willing to challenge us for it. To preserve our strategic advantage, we must operationalize new ideas, new technologies, and new ways of doing business. If we are not leading the wave of innova- tion in space, we will be left to drift in its wake.
SALTZMAN is chief of Space Operations for the United States Space Force, responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of U.S. space forces. Commissioned into the Air Force in 1991, Saltzman commanded at the squadron, group, and wing levels. In 2020, he transferred to the Space Force, where he re- mains committed to ensuring Guardians have the tools they need to secure U.S. interests in, from, and to space. Reproduction or reposting of articles from Defense Acquisition magazine should credit the authors and the magazine.
DAU Resources • EXE 4050V Leading Change to Drive Innovative Culture • Innovate to Win Playbook (For leaders and supervisors) • Unveiling the Catalysts of Innovation: Incentives for Innovation Adoption in DoD (Webinar)
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