Defense Acquisition Magazine March-April 2025

Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman speaks during the Guardian Field Forum at Joint Base Andrews, Md., March 15, 2024. The forum is a weeklong event that brings together junior Guardians and senior Space Force leaders to collaborate on initiatives to improve the Space Force. Source: U.S. Space Force photo by Eric Dietrich

if they could be, external pressure— albeit unintendedly—prevents it. Government organizations are bureaucracies. They operate at the will of the people with public money, and they bear responsibility for policy implementation and responsible dis- position of resources. They cannot be- have as entrepreneurs. They are not permitted to make overly risky bets. They are criticized when they gamble with the welfare of their constituents. The pressure on a government organi- zation is overwhelmingly to maintain the status quo, not to disrupt it. Even if a government were able to diverge from its nature and pursue real innovation, time remains a pow- erful barrier. Government bureaucra- cies are not nimble. By design, they distribute power and establish layers of oversight. So, if a company demon- strates a game-changing technology that we want today, it will take two years to secure funds through the fed- eral budgeting process and another year to align contractual vehicles. By the time we are ready to invest in that new idea, much less field it, the con-

cept will most likely have lost its nov- elty and very possibly its relevance. As such, governments traditionally prefer new–old ideas: taking some- thing that exists and making it mar- ginally better. There are good reasons for this. If you are doing something fa- miliar, then the necessary resources, processes, and institutions will al- ready be largely in place. Industrial support will be available. There will be existing concepts and expertise upon which to build. From a man- agement perspective, new–old ideas gather strong support. They affirm our standard ways of doing business, there are fewer unknowns to account for, and they seem like a low-risk way to enhance capability. Putting a new spin on an old idea allows you to leverage all the things that made the old idea possible but also constrains you to the boundaries of the status quo. New–new ideas offer an altogether different prospect. Because they break the status quo, the processes and institutions required to make them possible either will not exist or will be

ill-suited in their present forms. Tech- nical maturity will be low. Concepts will be notional at best. There might not be any practical experience upon which to build. Culturally, new–new ideas are rife with uncertainty. The government “system” will see them as risky, irresponsible, dangerous, and “not the way we do business.” Innovation is not just process im- provement. New–old ideas are im- portant and necessary but are not innovative. If we want to drive mate- rial change—if we want to seize the initiative on the battlefield—then we must learn to harness new–new ideas. “…and remains loyal to both entities—to the institution and the new truth.” —Art Kleiner To design and field the new–new capabilities that drive innovation, we must abandon our Industrial Age mindset with its predetermined con- cepts, requirements, and risk toler- ances. If we want to act differently, it starts with thinking differently.

16 | DEFENSE ACQUISITION | March-April 2025

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