deceased Mr. Ellison. He testified that there was concern by the parties (Mr. Ellison and Samson) over the location of the “147 acre” tract, including the 154 acre disputed tract and that the parties needed to somehow settle the location of said tract. It must be understood that both sides in the litigation knew that the Ellison 147 acre tract actually contained 301 acres and had confirmed such understanding in earlier tax documents and railroad commission documents. It cannot be emphasized enough – THERE ARE NO FIELDNOTES NOR OTHER DESCRIPTION(S) ANYWHERE IN THE IRION COUNTY DEED RECORDS OF THE 154 ACRE DISPUTED TRACT. THE PLAT REFLECTING SAME WAS CREATED – METHOD UNKNOWN. THE ROAD IS STILL WHERE IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ALTHOUGH ELIMINATED ON PLATS FILED BY THE DEFENDANT OIL COMPANIES IN SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIVE FILINGS. (See Exhibits “A-1” and “A-2”) Mr. Reece prepared a document (“2008 Boundary Stipulation”) to be signed by the mineral owners on both sides of the road, thereby creating a “new” 154 acre tract out of nothing (See Exhibit “B” for a partial copy and Exhibit “A-1” for the described plat). Reference to this instrument will be made throughout this paper. He then created what can only be called the title conveyancing document – a letter agreement with no grantor/ grantee, no stated consideration, no words of grant or ratification, not signed by Mr. Ellison’s wife (the leasehold interest was community property) and the promise of a more formal recordable document to be furnished (which it never was), herein the “October 16, 2008 Letter” found in Exhibit “C”. Please, stop reading and turn to Exhibit “C”. This is the instrument that The Court held took the title to the leasehold estate to154 acres away from a widow and delivered it to wealthy oil companies FREE. And with no words of conveyance……This document will be analyzed in more detail later in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to explore the brave new world the Texas Supreme Court has created due to its interpretation of the seven (7) real property rules of law herein identified
and to be aware that the rules of real property law that existed prior to this case may have been dramatically and permanently changed. But first, the legal underpinnings of stare decisis in Texas as well as when the overruling of a case is to be applied prospectively only or retrospectively.
Stare Decisis Generally in Texas
“As originally conceived and as generally applied, the doctrine of stare decisis governs only the determination of questions of law and its observance does not depend upon identity of parties. After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court, or the highest court of the State having jurisdiction of the particular case, the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in a subsequent suit between different parties. As a general rule the determination of a disputed issue of fact is not conclusive, under the doctrine of stare decisis , when the same issue later arises in another case between persons who are strangers to the record in the first suit.” 3 So, generally, the issue to be addressed with each of the seven identified principles of law apparently/potentially overruled by Ellison is whether the same rule or principle of law so identified had been previously ruled on by The Court. If the answer to that question is yes, then the issue becomes whether Ellison overruled that principle of law? And if it was overruled, how did Ellison overrule that principle of law? These issues will be addressed in each of the seven principles of law identified in this paper.
Changing the Rule of Law
Nothing in the history of stare decisis expressly forbids the changing of an existing rule of law (although The Court used to be reluctant to change real property rules of law 4 ) However, over time, for various reasons, The Court has found it necessary to overrule various earlier precedents.
[3] Swilley v. McCain , 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) [4] Robbins v. HNG Oil Co., 878 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.App. — 1994)
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G rowth T hrough E ducat i on - J uly / A ugus t / S ept ember 2024
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