Toward a Virtue Based Ethic for Nonessential Greenhouse Gas Emissions
infrastructure exists between the home and their job, but the parents own an internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle. Although the parent’s commitment to virtues of justice and compassion makes them averse to emitting GHGs, this is not an overriding reason to avoid a GHG-generating activity. In this case, the virtuous parent would choose to drive their ICE car to work because there is no easily accessible alternative. A desire so strong to avoid emitting GHG emissions that the parent does not go to work would represent an excess of justice and compassion. It is appropriate to recognize that the lack of public transportation is a systematic problem, so trying to compensate for a systematic injustice in an individual choice represents an excess of justice—vigilantism. Additionally, the parent is presumably dependent on their pay to provide for their children. In this case, not attending work to avoid emitting GHGs would represent a deficiency in the virtue of responsibility to their family. Although a virtue ethics framework would not encourage the most dramatic GHG-avoidance behavior in this instance, a virtuous parent would still be averse to emitting GHG emission and could take remedial actions to reduce the GHG intensity of their commute, such as not idling their vehicle or purchasing a more fuel-efficient vehicle if their finances permit. Virtue ethics is also best suited to provide guidance for individual GHG emissions because it is a relational philosophy. Virtue ethicists assert that we define our moral concepts of virtues by “encounter[ing] a wide variety of exemplars” and that we cultivate a habit of virtuous behavior by emulating “the virtuous agent.” 24 This aligns with the Confucian, relational conception of people that Hourdequin uses to justify the moral relevance of GHG emissions. Indeed, there is a
24 Hursthouse, 2022; Athanassoulis.
Volume VIII (2025) 26
Made with FlippingBook Annual report maker