Expert Bullshitting: Understanding Epistemic Trespassing through the Lens of Bullshit
The idea that trespassers partake in this form of protection is one of the most important aspects of T1. Oswald and Grosjean suggest that the greater the cost of your hypothesis being incorrect, the more care you will put into testing it. It may seem intuitive to say that the trespasser has a high cost associated with being incorrect, but it’s quite the opposite. If the trespasser is incorrect, they will likely realize they’re trespassing (if they don’t already know) and can easily retreat to their own field, pleading epistemic ignorance. Another option exists where they double down on their bullshit and continue to perpetuate T1 until some form of justification is reached (though this approach is unlikely for experts as they have a higher epistemic standing to uphold). These two escape plans that trespassers can lean on underscore that the internal benefits of being right far outweigh the cost of being wrong. If the trespassers turn out to be correct, they can justify T1 and the continuation of their behavior. By bullshitting their expertise and misrepresenting themselves, the agent doesn’t have to care about the truth. Instead, they only have to care about whether their actions will “suit [their] purpose.” 11 While T1 allows an agent to be uncaring regarding the truth, T2 makes it impossible for the agent to express the necessary epistemic care. This is because, “Bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require someone to talk without knowing what he is talking about.” 12 Frankfurt makes this claim regarding the non- experts' domain, where agents feel they need to have an opinion on everything, but applying this statement to epistemic trespassing carries the same implications. To understand why, we can look at Olsson’s Stability Action Thesis (SAT) and Reliability
11 Frankfurt, 56. 12 Frankfurt, 63.
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