Marist Undergraduate Philosophy Journal Vol VIII 2025

Diotima: The Marist Undergraduate Philosophy Journal

peers.” 18 This means that despite the bullshitter's opinions they will still encounter some accurate information and may even converge on the truth. Additionally, despite what the bullshitter says, the truth will usually prevail. 19 Certainly, epistemic trespassers have a unique ability to foster epistemic bubbles and echo chambers through their high regard and perceived epistemic authority. This does not change the fact that they receive the same pushback that every other bullshitter does. Just like bullshit, the biggest issue with epistemic trespassing is that “genuine experts” must “expend precious resources refuting the trespassers’ mistakes.” 20 While I do believe that trespassers are more epistemically threatening than the average bullshitter, because they require more resources to be disarmed, the effects of their actions are the same, as both divert from, question, and delay convergence on the truth. Conclusion Epistemic trespassers engage in actions and possess traits that are no different from that of bullshitters; all that separates them is their initial epistemic regard. While I don’t believe that epistemic trespassing is a useless concept, understanding it as bullshit is useful in evaluating the epistemic threat it poses. Yes, epistemic trespassers may take time away from true experts, act in an unconscientious manner, and even introduce misinformation into the world. However, they don’t always act maliciously nor get away with their bullshit. When an epistemic trespasser produces misinformation, it allows genuine experts to solidify the truths that define their fields, expose the individual, and anticipate any further bullshit that may circulate.

18 Olsson, 109. 19 Olsson, 109. 20 Ballantyne, 370.

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