A Reliance on Necessary False Belief: The Salvation of The Classical Analysis of Knowledge
A Reliance on Necessary False Belief: The Salvation of The Classical Analysis of
Knowledge Sebastian Smith University of Florida
Abstract The prevailing classical analysis of knowledge has proved impenetrable. Conceptualizing the jointly sufficient and individually necessary conditions of knowledge as justified true belief, the traditional tripartite approach proved convincing to many. However, in 1963, Edmund Gettier challenged the sufficiency of this formulation of knowledge, demonstrating that even with justified true belief, knowledge remains elusive. So, with justified true belief no longer sufficient, how then should we understand knowledge? In this paper, I will argue that Gettier successfully shows that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge. However, upon the addition of a final component to knowledge, precluding the agent’s reliance on a necessary false belief, we may rectify the Gettier problem, salvaging the classical analysis of knowledge and securing what it truly means to know a belief. I will begin my work by explaining the classical analysis of knowledge. In the next section, I will explain the “Gettier Problem,” as introduced by Edmund Gettier, revealing its implications for the traditional view of knowledge. I will then present my solution to the Gettier problem, defending the introduction of a fourth component to the classical analysis of knowledge, followed by consideration of two relevant objections.
Volume VIII (2025) 48
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