A Reliance on Necessary False Belief: The Salvation of The Classical Analysis of Knowledge
the classical analysis of knowledge, infamously coined the “Gettier problem,” strikes at the very core of traditional epistemology, forcing us to confront the potential failure of justified true belief in granting knowledge. In his 1963 piece, Gettier conceives the original two iterations of the Gettier case, the first involving two characters, Smith and Jones. Now, imagine Smith and Jones have both applied for the same job listing at a particular firm. Suppose that, for whatever reason, Smith has strong evidence for the proposition that “Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.” 2 Through existential generalization, Smith justifiably concludes that, “The man who has the job has ten coins in his pocket.” 3 But, unbeknownst to Smith, there has been a sudden shift in the company's recruitment strategy, resulting in Smith being hired instead of Jones. Additionally, unbeknownst to Smith, he happens to have ten coins in his pocket, as well. The subsequent implications on the classical analysis of knowledge are detrimental. The claim that “the man who has the job has ten coins in his pocket” ultimately becomes true through Smith’s coincidental hiring and possession of ten coins. Furthermore, Smith believed in the claim and was clearly justified, relying on robust evidence to reach his conclusion. Consequently, Smith has satisfied the three sufficient conditions of knowledge, having justified true belief that “the man who has the job has ten coins in his pocket” - which, according to the classical analysis, guarantees that Smith now knows the fact.
2 Gettier, Edmund, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” Analysis , 23 (6), 1963: 121-123. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638%28196306%2923%3A6%3C121%3AIJTBK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 3 Gettier, 121.
Volume VIII (2025) 50
Made with FlippingBook Annual report maker