A Reliance on Necessary False Belief: The Salvation of The Classical Analysis of Knowledge
central station clock, whose hands read the time to be 1:17 pm, the actual correct time. He concludes, therefore, that the time is 1:17 pm. But here's the twist: while the clock reflected the precise time, it is broken and hasn’t moved its hands in the past two days. “Smith just happened to look at the clock in one of the rare moments when it wasn’t wrong.” 4 So, Smith believes the time to be 1:17 pm, which is true, and he is also justified in believing it, relying on the reasonable evidence in his grasp. Yet, despite having justified true belief, should Smith be said to know the time as 1:17 pm? Intuitively, the resounding response is no. Smith does not possess knowledge of the time, only brought to this conclusion by extreme luck and coincidence. In conclusion, the classical analysis of knowledge’s assertion that justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge is shown to be false, undermined by the infamous Gettier problem . Gettier’s argument may be reconstructed as follows: 1. If justified true belief is sufficient for knowing, then, for any case, C, if there is justified true belief, then there is knowledge in C. 2. But in cases I and II, there is justified true belief but no knowledge in C. 3. Therefore, justified true belief is not sufficient for knowing. This is a Modus Tollens argument: If P, then Q; ~ Q; therefore, ~P; rendering the argument valid. So, is the classical analysis of knowledge salvageable? Or has Gettier inflicted irreversible damage? III. A Solution to the Gettier Problem: The Reliance on Necessary False Belief
4 Nagel, The Analysis of Knowledge , 46-59.
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