Diotima: The Marist Undergraduate Philosophy Journal
The wrath of the Gettier problem on the classical analysis of knowledge is profound. Gettier disproves the joint sufficiency of justified true belief in attaining knowledge, a staple assertion of knowledge formulation by the classical analysis. Therefore, if we hope to salvage this traditional account, some new component may be introduced to knowledge, reinstating the joint sufficiency of JTB and patching the vulnerability exposed by Gettier. I argue that this condition is: “S does not rely on a necessary false belief in deriving P.” When united with justified true belief, I argue this condition reaffirms the joint sufficiency towards knowledge, restoring the classical analysis and resolving the Gettier problem. My solution is represented as follows: where S stands for a subject and P for any proposition, S knows P if and only if: 1. P is true 2. S believes P 3. S is justified in believing P
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4. S does not rely on a necessary false belief in deriving P
To help us understand my proposed solution in more detail, I will outline the two types of false belief present in the pursuit of knowledge: eliminable false belief and necessary false belief. First, there are false beliefs that our subject S consults as evidence for P, but they are not required nor significant for S to reach his conclusion. In other words, the false belief is eliminable from S’s reasoning and justification for P. We’ll call these instances eliminable false beliefs. On the other hand, the second category of false belief is integral to the subjects’ quest for knowledge, in no way
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