A Reliance on Necessary False Belief: The Salvation of The Classical Analysis of Knowledge
This argument is a hypothetical syllogism: If A then B; If B then C; therefore, if A then C; confirming the argument as valid. IV. The Detective Objection: Knowledge amid Reliance on False Belief Jennifer Nagel objects to the contention that reliance on false belief is sufficient for no knowledge, asserting that “people apparently can know amid the presence of a supporting false belief.” 7 To substantiate this claim, Nagel proposes a scenario where a subject depends on a false belief but still intuitively achieves knowledge. Imagine a detective is investigating an assault that occurred in broad daylight. Following the interviewing of 12 witnesses, all claim to have clearly seen Jones hit Smith. The detective also collects physical evidence, finding remnants of Smith’s blood on Jones's knuckles, confirmed through further forensic testing. She even gathers a confession from Jones himself and a statement from Smith in corroboration. As most would tend to agree, the detective knows that Jones hit Smith. But now, suppose that out of the 12 witnesses, one of them lied to the detective. While the other 11 truly did see Jones hit Smith, the estranged witness was blatantly dishonest, maintaining that he saw Jones hit Smith when, in reality, he saw nothing. “If the detective believes that all the witnesses, including the liar, saw the assault, then she relies on a false belief in reaching her judgment that Jones hit Smith.” 8 However, notwithstanding the false belief, the detective evidently knows that Jones
7 Nagel, The Analysis of Knowledge , 46-59. 8 Nagel, The Analysis of Knowledge , 46-59.
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