Diotima: The Marist Undergraduate Philosophy Journal
hit Smith. Therefore, Nagel concludes that an agent’s reliance on false belief is not sufficient for a lack of knowledge. Despite correctly deducing that the detective has attained knowledge of Jones hitting Smith, the objection fails to account for the relevant distinction among false beliefs, as not all false beliefs are created equal. Referring to our earlier delineation of false beliefs, there are two categories: eliminable false beliefs and necessary false beliefs. While knowledge may persist amid eliminable false beliefs, if the false belief is deemed necessary to the agent’s justification, the agent is precluded from obtaining any knowledge. To determine if a false belief raises to the level of necessary, we employ the necessary test, calculating whether the false belief in question was required for the subject to reach their conclusion. Let us apply this test to Nagel’s detective case. Without the false testimony provided by the singular witness, would the detective still have come to know that Jones hit Smith? Well, absolutely! The detective still can depend on 11 other witness statements confirming that they saw Jones hit Smith, the physical evidence collected from the scene, and the confession from Jones himself. Therefore, this false belief is clearly not necessary to the detective’s justification. Instead, it is classified as an eliminable false belief, empowering her to still secure knowledge in its presence. Ultimately, this objection fails to undermine the individual necessity of my fourth component of knowledge, overlooking the relevant distinction among false beliefs. While correct in concluding that the detective secured knowledge amid a false belief, this belief was only eliminable. In my view, knowledge may persist in the presence of eliminable false beliefs. Crucially, it's the necessary false beliefs that impede
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