A Reliance on Necessary False Belief: The Salvation of The Classical Analysis of Knowledge
knowledge, invariably leading to judgments that are outright false or purely accidental. My solution in precluding a subject from relying on such false beliefs reinstates the integrity of knowledge, remaining fortuitous against Nagel’s objection. V. The Birthday Party Objection: Pinpointing the Operative Belief Still, some philosophers resist this addition to the classical analysis of knowledge, skeptical of its veracity as an individual requirement for knowing. Some may argue that not relying on a necessary false belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge and that there are conceivable cases in which an agent may attain knowledge, despite a reliance on such false belief. The following objection, which I have deemed The Birthday Party Objection, manifests this position. Imagine I am throwing a birthday party for my son, who has made many friends in elementary school. In preparation for the festivities, I purchased 100 party hats, planning for each guest to wear one during the celebration. Once everyone has arrived, I count all the children present, arriving at a total of 53 attendees. Considering I purchased 100 hats, I conclude I have enough party hats for the entire party. However, unbeknownst to me, I made a mistake counting - there aren’t 53 kids crammed into my home, but only 52. In this instance, it appears that I have relied upon a necessary false belief in concluding that I have enough party hats for the event. Yet, intuitively, many would agree, as do I, that I know I have enough party hats for the entire party. This demonstrates that knowledge may still exist amid reliance on a necessary false belief, refuting my solution as an individual requirement for knowledge.
Volume VIII (2025) 60
Made with FlippingBook Annual report maker