The Volkswagen emissions scandal
Pischetsrieder as CEO, with former executives describing his management style as authoritarian and demanding. VW engineers faced the brunt of the pressure. When they requested the addition of AdBlue tanks to lower NOx emissions, their request was denied (Flender, 2019). They now faced the impossible task of producing ‘ clean diesel ’ vehicles that aligned with the CEO’s demands. To resolve this, software, later coined as a ‘ defeat device ’ , was created in order to cheat testing. The device was software program med into the cars’ electronic control systems to detect when the vehicle was undergoing emissions testing, temporarily reducing emissions to compliant levels. The software was extremely sophisticated; it monitored speed, engine operation, air pressure, and the position of the steering wheel. When it detected that it was in a testing scenario, it would activate certain emission control systems with decreased power and performance, effectively decreasing NOx readings (Rattalma, 2017). The vehicles’ true emissions, however, were vastly different during real -world driving conditions, and the truth was exposed in 2014 in a study performed by West Virginia University (WVU). The university was hired by the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) to execute standard emissions tests on diesel cars in the US. WVU professor Arvind Thiruvengadam and his colleagues tested two VW cars and found their claims of low emissions were inaccurate and unachievable (Glinton, 2015). The findings revealed the company’s deception, showing that the tested vehicles emitted up to forty times the permitted levels of NOx gasses (Forsgren, 2019). Thiruvengadam’s discovery led to an investigation by the EPA and CARB, which ultimately exposed the scope of V W’s deception. When WVU’s study reached VW executives, they initially attempted to downplay the findings and adamantly denied any wrongdoing. Oliver Schmidt, general manager in charge of the Environmental and Engineering Office, was in charge of responding to the crisis. Schmidt’s main responsibility was communicating and coordinating with the EPA and CARB. It was uncovered that Schmidt was aware of the defeat device, but for more than a year he dismissed the pressing questions and attempted to stonewall the agencies with promises of recalls and simple software fixes (Forsgren, 2019). VW’s defence strategy worked, but only for a short while. VW officials tasked Schmidt to mislead the regulators but not to reveal the defeat device’s existence. Winterkorn encouraged Schmidt’s actions and told him to meet with the EPA and CARB, and lie. In August 2015, Schmidt met with CARB officials intending to continue the deceit. It was at this meeting, however, that engineer Stuart Johnson revealed the existence of a defeat device, making him the first whistleblower in this case. On September 3, 2015, VW had no other choice but to admit the existence of the defeat devices and that they were installed on almost 600,000 diesel cars sold in the US, as well as 11 million more sold worldwide (Forsgren, 2019). All VW diesel sales came to a halt after the EPA issued a Notice of Violation for failure to comply with the US Clean Air Act. Shortly after, Winterkorn resigned, and Michael Horn, VW’s American CEO, claimed that a group of ‘ rogue software engineers ’ were responsible for the defeat device, and that management officials were unaware of the deception.
The Dieselgate scandal saw VW implicated in a complex web of legal violations, spanning several legal sectors. These included environmental regulations, corporate fraud and consumer protection. Each violation carried serious legal consequences and class-action lawsuits from consumers and investors.
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