The Belt and Road Initiative
recipient countries to act in support of China. This is problematic as it means that the US, China’s main geopolitical rival, gains leverage while China loses leverage over recipient nations. If China were to pursue such a policy, the outcry from the press might hinder further attempts for China to expand the BRI. A similar case can be made for the string of pearls strategy. Like the debt-trap theory, this theory lacks the evidence and analysis required for academics to believe that China intends to perform such a policy. However, the fallacy is even more pronounced. This is because this theory originated in 2004, while the BRI was launched only in 2013, in which the BRI was tied to this theory due to a lack of evidence from existing projects. This lack of evidence remains. China owns two foreign military bases: one in Tajikistan and one in Djibouti. Neither of can be used to surround India. These two military bases are too few to encircle an entire country and are too sporadically spread out to suggest that the bases are used to surround industry. Most importantly, the bases were also established outside the BRI framework. Therefore, it cannot be said that the BRI itself is used to further the political goals stipulated within the strings of pearls strategy. There is also little evidence to suggest that China is trying to use land development to turn foreign land into military bases by building military-industrial capacity. For example, the most logical country to have a Chinese military base, Pakistan, due to their close relationship, does not hold a Chinese military base or show signs of BRI funds being used to develop military-industrial capacity. Instead, the $62 billion project will mostly have funds allocated to establish an oil pipeline and railways connecting the Chinese region of Kashgar with Gwadar (Shaikh and Chen, 2021). This shows a clear lack of intention in developing ports for military purposes, making it unlikely that the Chinese are trying to militarily encircle India. It would also not be in China’s interest to act so aggressively against India. Currently, China is India’s 2nd largest trading partner, and the balance of trade is significantly in China's favour, with an average of $87.07 billion in 2018-2019 (Ghiasy, 2021). Furthermore, both countries share similar views on global issues such as climate change and strive for a multi-polar global order. They frequently participate in meetings at forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) summits. India is also the second largest stakeholder in the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the largest beneficiary of its concessional loans (Ghiasy, 2021). Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have met eighteen times since 2014. This demonstrates the relationship's high-level political consultation and economic cooperation, just not under the BRI banner. Therefore, it does not make sense for China to jeopardize such a profitable relationship by trying to militarily encircle India.
Instead, the BRI is used more as an economic campaign. These come under two major categories:
1. Increasing connectivity and coordination of infrastructure plans to encourage trade to China China wants to build infrastructure because, over the past 40 years of reform and opening up, it has become the world's largest producer of high-speed railways, with over 50% of such technology coming from China (Kelly, 2024). This has been done as a way for local governments to appease the central government. Central governments usually set goals for GDP growth, around 5% each year, and have
168
Made with FlippingBook flipbook maker