The Asia Minor disaster – Greece’s ‘ national catastrophe ’ ?
Alexandros Hall
It was under a ‘ ghastly, shambling procession of people ’ 1 that Greece’s ‘ Great Idea ’ ( Megáli Idéa ), referring to the concept of a Greek state encompassing all Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, was forever buried. Following the defeat of the Greek military expedition to Asia Minor in summer 1922, Greece signed the Lausanne Convention on 30 January 192, and the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923. The first of these agreements stipulated the simultaneous expulsion of 1,200,000 Orthodox Christians from Turkey, and of 350,000 Muslims from Greece. The second agreement ordered the return of virtually all of Greece’s territorial gains made under the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, such as eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and all Greek possessions in Asia Minor. Since the Treaty of Lausanne, the ‘ Asia Minor Catastrophe ’ ( Mikrasiatikí Katastrophí ), as it is known in Greece, has been labelled by many as ‘ a greater blow to Hellenism than the fall of Byzantium in 1453 ’ . 2 It is no wonder that commentators assign such significance to this event, as Greece’s defeat defined the nation’s experience of the twentieth century. However, while the Asia Minor disaster certainly had many ramifications, the traditional Greek narrative often neglects its benefits to Greece. In this essay I will evaluate the political, economic, and ethnic impacts of the Asia Minor disaster and the population exchange on Greece. In the first section, I will analyse the effects of the Asia Minor disaster in shaping Greek politics after 1922. In the second section, I will reflect on how the settlement of re fugees affected Greek agriculture and industry, alongside the Greek state’s finances. Finally, I will examine the consequences of the Asia Minor disaster in altering Greece’s ethn ic composition. The outbreak of the First World War exacerbated existing political and social fissures in Greek society, leading to a division which defined twentieth-century Greek politics and became known as the ‘ National Schism ’ ( Ethnikós Dikhasmós ). On one side stood Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, the reformist leader of the Liberal Party who embodied the ‘ Great Idea ’ . Venizelos had directed the successful annexation of Macedonia, Crete and Epirus during the Balkan Wars, and so had the support of these ‘ New Lands ’ ( Néai Khórai ). Having been promised concessions in Asia Minor by Britain, Venizelos supported Greece’s entrance into the First World War. In opposition stood King Constantine, who advocated for neutrality as he was convinced of Germany’s military supremacy. The King and the Prime Minister’s differing foreign policies prompted a constitutional crisis which began with Venizelos’s resignation in 1915. Elections were then called in June, which the Liberals won, and again in December, which the Venizelists boycotted. This led to a disproportionate royalist majority, prompting Venizelos to form a provisional government in Thessaloniki. By 1916, the country was thus divided into the Venizelist north and the royalist south. Both sides began vigorous purges of thei r political opponents, and Venizelos’s provisional government entered the First World War on the side of the Allies. After threats from the Allies, King Constantine abdicated in favour of his second son,
1 Hemingway, E. ‘Refugee Procession is Scene of Horror.’ Toronto Daily Star , 14/11/1922. 2 Gibbons, H. A. (1929) Europe Since 1918 . New York: p. 435.
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