JFK and African nationalism
food to the region via the UN. 7 In February 1960, the U.S. delegation voted for a UN resolution that African nationalists had proposed, to reconvene the Congolese parliament, restore constitutional government and bring the CIA- backed Colonel Mobutu’s troops under the discipline and control of the UN. This led to a broad coalition government which featured many political ideologies under Cyrille Adoula who, while pro-western, still held strong nationalistic sympathies. 8 These actions taken by Kennedy prevented a US/Belgium aligned puppet state being formed in the Congo with unlimited access to its resources, and defied both the interests of the CIA and the interests of the US western allies. 9 This once again, showed that Kennedy valued the interests of African nationalists over Cold War considerations. After the death of UN general secretary Dan Hammarskjold, Kennedy took over the task of pushing for the peacekeeping operation and bringing an end to the Katangese succession. After a couple of controversial skirmishes, UN forces managed finally to make Tshombe capitulate in mid-January 1963. The attempted Belgian-backed Katanga secession was over, and the Congo was reunited. In September 1963, Kennedy called for and received further UN funding to support UN peacekeeping troops in the Congo for another year. 10 Although the secession had ended, Kennedy still felt the newly independent state was fragile and would fall apart without the support of the UN peacekeeping troops. This illustrated that Kennedy was eager to preserve the newly independent state of Congo and his commitment to African nationalism over appeasing his Cold War allies. However, an example of when Kennedy’s desire to court African nationalism was overridden by the considerations of the Cold War is Kennedy’s policy on South Africa. South Africa had seceded from the British Commonwealth and declared itself an independent republic in May 1961. This was then followed by H. F. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister of South Africa’s informal ratification of the apartheid system by cracking down on all forms of dissent. In response, the U.S. government faced what the State Department privately called ‘ an embarrassing choice between security requirements and basic political principle ’ . 11 This is because despite South Africa having effectively turned into authoritarian police state, its harbours and location, next to east-west shipping routes, remained vital for U.S. military planners who had not forgotten the disastrous Suez Crisis in 1956. The establishment of a lucrative missile and satellite tracking station outside of Pretoria made it impossible for Kennedy to politically distance himself from South Africa’s apartheid, 12 sacrificing the needs of African nationalists for the sake of Cold War considerations. As with his policy towards civil rights in America, Kennedy took a ‘style over substance’ approach to the situation, taking a rhetorically tough stand against apartheid while trying not to damage the beneficial agreements the US had with Pretoria. This policy is best represented by Kennedy’s announcement of an arms embargo on South Africa in August 1963. This allowed the Kennedy 7 Weisak n.6. 8 Mahoney n.3. 9 Weisak n.6. 10 Mahoney n.3. 11 Davenport, R. (2000) South Africa: A Modern History. 12 Borstelmann, T. (2000) ‘‘ Hedging our Bets and Buying Time ’ : John Kennedy and Racial Revolutions in the American South and Southern Africa’, Diplomatic History 24: 435-463.
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