JFK and African nationalism
administration to symbolically dissociate itself from the awkward association with apartheid South Africa without having to place substantial sanctions and risk losing the missile station. 13 As Kennedy’s secretary of state Dean Rusk said to South African foreign minister Eric Louw: ‘ while US and SA cannot agree on the matter race relations ’ there was ‘ no need why this disagreement should infect the total range of our relations ’ . 14 The lack of solid opposition from the U.S. and the international community towards Verwoerd’s regime, guided by the risk of damaging Cold War alliances, made white support overwhelmingly unanimous. This, paired with the banning of dissent, forced the African National Congress (ANC) to radicalize and begin a sabotage campaign under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. 15 However, both the ANC and the South African communist party were both closely allied against Pretoria, although they did not share similar beliefs. In the eyes of Kennedy, therefore, unable to look past his Cold War mindset, the ANC qualified as an organization of unacceptable revolutionaries. Indeed, the ANC, according to the Kennedy administration, was ‘ dominated by the Communist Party at the leadership ’ . 16 By refusing to the understand the differences of ideology and legitimacy between the Communist Party and the ANC, the Kennedy falsely identified Mandela and his colleagues as enemies of the United States. Kennedy’s policy on South Africa as a whole indicates that , although Kennedy was sympathetic to the plights of Africans nationalist, he was willing to not alienate the South African government in fears of weakening his position in the Cold War, showing that he ultimately valued cold war considerations over African nationalism. The Kennedy administration faced a similar dilemma when having to make ‘ an embarrassing choice ’ between courting African nationalism or preserving cold war commitments with its policy towards Portugal, the only European government to utterly reject the goal of independence for its African colonies. 17 Unlike with South Africa, Kennedy initially took a much harsher approach towards Portugal, going beyond his usual method of rhetorical pressure. This can be seen by his sharp divergence with Eisenhower’s policy in the UN, by voting in favour of resolutions concerning Portuguese colonialism in the General Assembly in April 1961, in the Security Council in June 1961 and again in the General Assembly in December 1961 and January 1962. This divergence from what had been seen as standard U.S. doctrine of supporting western European interests in Africa led to a deterioration of relations with a member of NATO, and showed that Kennedy was genuinely interested in the courting and development of African nationalism. So much so that he was willing to overlook Cold War considerations and sacrifice the good relations the U.S. had with one of its western allies in Europe.
Moreover, the Kennedy administration intensified its contact with and aid to Angolan nationalist groups, albeit ones with a closer western leaning, such as the UPA led by Holden Roberto. The Kennedy administration also further pressured the Portuguese by terminating commercial arms sales to them,
13 Borstelmann n.12. 14 Rusk to U.S. Embassy in South Africa, 25 October 1961, FRUS , 1961-1963, 21:611. 15 Borstelmann n.12. 16 Satterthwaite to Rusk, 18 December 1962, enclosing ‘Country Internal Defense Plan,’ NSF, box 3. 17 Borstelmann n.12.
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