JFK and African nationalism
reducing military aid from twenty-five million to three million dollars 18 and refusing to sell Portugal military equipment destined to ‘non - NATO’ purposes , that is, military equipment that could be used in Africa. 19 However, this new policy of forcing decolonialization by the Kennedy administration would be short lived and from mid-1962 a gradual reversal in policy making began. The American delegation began in the UN to abstain or vote against resolutions on Portuguese territories, and the Kennedy administration resumed sales of military weapons to Portugal. More importantly, the contacts with the Angolan nationalists were significantly reduced and downgraded. From late October 1962 onwards the USUN and State department were forbidden to receive Holden Roberto. This reversal in policymaking was primarily due to the U.S. military base in the Azores 20 which was vital to the Americans ’ ability to execute required military missions under wartime and emergency conditions. 21 The United States military feared that the anticolonial stance of the Kennedy administration could cause a breakdown of relations with Portugal and put at risk the usage of the base, especially as the agreement that authorized the presence of U.S. forces in the Azores would end on 31 December 1962. Thanks to the reversal of anti-colonial policies, the USA was able to retain usage of its military base in the Azores. Kennedy’s early policies on Portuguese decolon ization show that he was willing to support and court pro-African nationalists and decolonization, as demonstrated by the increase in contacts with Angolan nationalist groups and by the voting record of the USUN. However, his later reversal of these policies also shows that, as with South Africa, Kennedy, while taking a tough rhetorical stance, was keen to do the least damage as he could do to American-Portuguese relations in order to preserve the fruits of their relationship, primarily, the Azores military base. Once again, then, Kennedy demonstrated that, when it came to deciding to support African nationalism or retain substantial Cold War assets, he would pick the latter. In conclusion, I believe Kennedy was seriously committed to supporting African nationalism to the extent that he was willing to prioritize it over Cold War considerations. This can be seen by his backing of African nationalists such as Lumumba and Adoula in the Congo over the interests of the CIA and Belgium. Moreover, his earlier policies towards Portugal, such as the reduction in military funding and arms sales to pressure decolonization, indicate that he was ready to risk the deterioration of Cold War alliances with western powers for the sake of African nationalism. However, I believe when it came to serious considerations that had strong Cold War implications such as the US military base in the Azores and the missile and satellite tracking station in South Africa, Kennedy was willing to sacrifice his commitment to African nationalism in order to preserve his position in the Cold War. He thus showed that he valued Cold War considerations over African nationalism.
18 Muehlenbeck n.3. 19 Rodrigues, L (2013) ‘The United States and Portuguese Decolon ization ’, Portuguese Studies Vol.29: 164-185. 20 Ibid. 21 ‘Presidential Task Force on Portuguese Territories in Africa. Report. July 12, 1961.’ NA, SDCF, 1960-63, Box 1816.
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