Bayes correlated equilibrium and inflationary bias
In brief, the thesis offered a new perspective in the field of economic policy analysis, proposing BCE as a mechanism for ensuring and maintaining stability in the economy. Our data analysis shows that the interrelation of monetary policy actions and economic decisions gives rise to a new era of inherently stabilizing economic policy making.
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