Moral intuition
that moral intuitions inspire us to action in a fundamentally different way from other forms of intuition.
I reject this last characteristic, not because moral intuition does not inspire us to action, but instead because there is an intermediary step between the two states of observation and action: that of response. When we watch the TV show, we observe that the character is treated unjustly and thus we have an intuitive response condemning the action of injustice. However, no action can come from this response: the show is fictional. That begs the question, then, what the purpose of intuition is in ethical evaluation: the example shows that the initial product of intuition is not action but emotional response. This begs the question, however, of how moral intuitions differ from other forms of intuition. I argue here that they fundamentally are the same. If we take the view that moral intuitions are the routine, immediate emotional responses to observed states of the world, this definition could fit the aesthetic response of example 3. Without the distinction of moral intuition as imperative, moral intuitions act in the same way as other forms of intuition. What, then, makes moral intuition special? Moral intuition is the fundamental building block of our ethical systems of evaluation, although this happens in much the same way as in the case of aesthetic intuitions. Our aesthetic intuitions are informed by and themselves inform our beliefs and principles in relation to artwork. We study critical opinion that changes how we see certain works, but how we see those works also effects our critical beliefs. This analogy may seem tenuous, but it can be understood better through discussion of John Rawls ’ idea of reflective equilibrium. To Rawls, we make initial moral judgements in all sorts of situations. The examples of 1 and 2 would count as these initial moral judgements. Rawls called these ‘ judgements ’ , but using our definition of moral intuition we can just as easily apply that term here. It is worth noting that to Rawls, judgements included both intuitive judgements and measured judgements involving rational deliberation. We should see moral intuitions, then, as an important half of judgement. These judgements, or intuitions, exist alongside moral principles. Moral principles are moral values and theories which we hold either consciously or subconsciously. Examples could be the classic utilitarian greatest happiness principle or a rights-based approach of ‘ all have a right to life ’ or ‘ all have a right to free and fair elections ’ . These principles inform our moral intuitions: someone who holds to democratic principles will be intuitively outraged at seeing examples of election fraud or other unfair behaviour. But moral intuitions also affect our moral principles in a process Rawls calls ‘ mutual adjustment ’ . On seeing examples of muggings, we may develop the principle ‘ theft should not be tolerated ’ . This principle will likely already be formed through societal teaching but will be enforced and made most vivid only when the intuition occurs. Therefore, the two elements of our system of ethical evaluation are judgement and principle. This is the purpose of moral intuition: to provide the response which works with our pre-existing principles to make up a system of ethical evaluations. Therefore, whether our intuitions can be trusted or not is a strange question, as they simply act as our intuitive response to cases around us and should be evaluated based on our moral principles. Those moral principles should themselves be evaluated by ensuring that we are logically consistent in our beliefs.
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