Moral intuition
This discussion, however, has left out the key element of whether these moral principles or judgements actually correspond to mind-independent moral properties. I make this choice based on Rawls ’ argument that we can distinguish ontological and moral questions, or questions of moral theory and other areas of moral philosophy. Moral theory is the practice of refining our moral judgements (such as whether we can trust our moral intuition), whereas moral philosophy also involves questions of moral ontology and epistemology: whether there are moral facts which our judgements correspond to. We can discuss the role of moral intuition without ever having to propose a realist view of morality; we can instead use the criterion of logical consistency to judge intuitions as interdependent parts of a system of moral principles. I believe that much of the confusion comes from the traditional view of moral intuitions, which sees moral intuition as consisting of self-evident, infallible judgements on ethical situations. One proponent of this view was W.D Ross, who proposed a list of ‘ prima facie ’ ethical duties which expressed themselves through our moral intuitions. 4 Ross lists seven duties: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, non-malevolence, and self-improvement. To Ross, moral intuitions resulted from these moral truths revealing themselves to us. Of course, such a view immediately leads to complications regarding how these intuitions work in practice. Cases of conflicting duties show this theory to be faulty at best. 5 While beneficence may be a duty, can this apply in every situation in which the duty of self- improvement also applies? Surely many cases would see us put the wellbeing of others before our own self-improvement if we are to remain beneficent. Ross responds to these claims by arguing that ethical dilemmas never really exist, as one duty will always over-rule another. But which, and why? Ross never explains how these duties can simultaneously be our deontological duty to follow yet can be ignored if the situation calls for it. Furthermore, the theory doesn’t tell us how we know which duty applies in each situation. Ross’ principles, then, are unsystematic, and fail to provide clear answers. By instead approaching the issue through a conception of moral intuitions as emotional responses, capable of leading us to unsupported or illogical conclusions, we can sidestep these issues and create a more coherent view of moral intuition. By allowing our intuitions to be fallible, we can accept that our intuitions may be false in any particular situation. Then, by viewing intuition as part of a wider system of moral judgement, the reflective equilibrium, we create a more coherent picture of intuitions as reactions to situations which demand our moral evaluation and are based on and inform our values. Thus, we can judge particular cases of moral intuition in regard to wider moral principles.
Bibliography
Campbell, C. A. (1967). ‘Moral intuitions and the principle of self- realization’ , in In Defence of Free Will. London Kekes, J. (1986) ‘Moral intuition ’, American Philosophical Quarterly 23.1: 83 – 93 Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice . Cambridge, Ma. Rawls, J. (1974) ‘ The independence of moral theory’ , Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 48: 5 – 22 Ross, W. D. (2002). The right and the good . Oxford (ed. P. Stratton-Lake)
4 Ross 2002. 5 Campbell 1967.
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