accessed without the owner's knowledge. There is some uncertainty about whether in some circumstances a cellphone can be covertly activated from a power-off state (Scharr, 2014). How extensively cellphones can be compromised, how widely distributed are the means and expertise for doing this, and whether it is economically feasible to do this on a mass scale or only for a limited number of selected ‘targets’, are all matters of current research (see e.g. Marczac et al., 2018, on the recent use of Pegasus spyware). As well as being vulnerable to surveillance by government agencies, mobile phones are increasingly targeted by so-called 'stalkerware' or 'spouseware' deployed by partners, family members, and others (for a series of reviews, see Motherboard, 2018), as well as by commercial organisations, employers, and generally by any users of suitable 'crimeware'. 4.5 Long-term consequences Once information has been acquired by surveillance we should assume that it will be stored by whoever has acquired it for as long as possible. The extent and duration of this storage will be limited only by technological and budgetary constraints. Recent developments in techniques such as automatic speech recognition, steady growth in the processing power and storage capacity of computers, and falling costs of storage, strongly suggest that verbatim content of at least some telecommunications may now be being preserved indefinitely. Being preserved indefinitely, it also remains vulnerable indefinitely to further theft and distribution. There is therefore a real risk that a recording of a psychoanalytic session will one day be posted on YouTube or elsewhere, and that it could subsequently ‘go viral’. Even in a country where privacy of communication is afforded some degree of legal protection, there remains a real possibility that at some point in the future an authoritarian and undemocratic regime will achieve power. Such a regime would probably inherit information gained from past surveillance and be able to use it for arbitrary and repressive measures against individuals and groups. Stored information obtained by surveillance is also vulnerable, through leaks and/or hacking, to acquisition by anyone with an interest in turning it to some purpose, which could include journalists, actuaries, criminal organisations, malicious pranksters, terrorists, and foreign governments. Regardless of any legal or other safeguards currently in place, mass surveillance of telecommunication thus creates risks to confidentiality which potentially extend far into the future, over the entire lifetimes of patients and those of their families, friends, and associates. Different psychoanalysts will make different estimates of the magnitude of the risk, but the fact that the risk exists is not in doubt. 4.6 Implications for the IPA and its members The IPA therefore faces a dilemma. On the one hand it is seeking to expand the profession, including into new geographic areas, whilst maintaining high professional standards, a task
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