Under the theory of quasi-estoppel, a party is precluded “from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken.” Id . at *856. In order to prevail on a defense of quasi-estoppel, the party must prove that (1) the opposing party acquiesced to or benefited from a position inconsistent with the opposing party’s present position; (2) it would be unconscionable to allow the opposing party to assert their present position; and (3) the opposing party had knowledge of all material facts at the time of the conduct on which the estoppel is based. Here, the Court found that all three factors of quasi- estoppel were satisfied. Upon the death of each presumed joint tenant the surviving Heirs received an increase in their respective interest and executed a corresponding division order. To allow the plaintiffs to argue now that the 1989 Deed created a tenancy in common would be to allow plaintiffs to assert a right that was inconsistent with the position taken by their parents. Further, a finding that the Deed created a tenancy in common would certainly be to the detriment of defendants, who would lose a significant portion of their interest if plaintiffs were allowed to assert the rights of a tenancy in common. Such a finding would thus be unconscionable. Finally, because the survivingHeirs signed a division order each time, there is no evidence that plaintiff ’s parents lacked knowledge of the material facts. Because the Court determined that defendants were successful in claiming the defense of quasi-estoppel, the Court held that all of the plaintiffs except for Carol, the daughter of Clara, were barred from making their claims. Because Clara was the first of the original Heirs to die, Clara (and Clara’s daughter Carol as her heir) did not receive the benefits of a joint tenancy. As such, the Court held that Carol was not barred from claiming that the Deed created a tenancy in common and thus considered her claim. In interpreting a deed, a court will ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language within the four corners of the instrument, examining and harmonizing the entire instrument to give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless. Though plaintiff Carol argued that the Deed’s use of the word “successor” indicated the original Heirs’ intent to make the interests inheritable, the Court found that such an interpretation would render meaningless the reservation provision of the Deed. The opening and closing statements indicated that the interest was reserved “for Grantors and the survivor of Grantors” and that the reservation would continue “until the death of the last survivor of the seven (7) [original
Heirs].” Id . at *858. The Court found that the reservation’s language implied that the survivors of the original seven Heirs were the intended beneficiaries of the reservation – not the heirs of the original seven Heirs. Because the Court determined that “successor” and “survivor” could be read as synonymous, a finding that the 1989 Deed created a joint tenancy would allow all of the provisions of the Deed to be harmonized. Wagenschein was ultimately another study in deed interpretation. It underscored the notion that although there are no magic words that will create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, once such joint ownership is established it can have a profound impact on the later disposition of interests. Of greater import was the Court’s finding of a joint tenancy by quasi-estoppel. In so finding, the Court necessarily took certain surrounding circumstances under consideration such as the execution of division orders consistent with a joint tenancy. A petition for review of the Appellate Court’s decision was denied by the Texas Supreme Court. _____________________________________________________ www.kolawllp.com © 2021 Kiefaber & Oliva LLP. All rights reserved. This publication may qualify as “Attorney Advertising” requiring notice in some jurisdictions. Houston (principal office): 815 Walker St., Suite 1140, Houston, Texas 77002, 713-229-0360 | Columbus: One East Livingston Avenue, Suite B, Columbus, Ohio 43215, 614-349-4525. CONTACT If you have any questions regarding this case law update or suggestions for topics to be covered in future issues, please call our office at 713-229-0360 or contact:
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G r o w t h T h r o u g h E d u c a t i o n - J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y / M a r c h 2 0 2 2
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