Can we ever trust what we remember?
Daniel Kamaluddin
‘At that time, I could no more believe my eyes than I can now trust my memory’. 1 False memory has confronted us as long as we have puzzled over the crucial questions of our existence: challenging our construction of personal identity and cohesive social narratives. Nevertheless, I shall show that the purpose of memory is not to provide a wholly accurate depiction of the past, but rather is a tool of the mind that collates the essence of experiences into subjectively meaningful narratives. Thus, even superficia lly ‘false’ memories are meaningful to understanding our past, ourselves, and our communities. But before proving this, we must explain why we are so concerned about the ability to trust our memories. Memories are mental information, recalled from experiences of the past. Like fossils: they are remnants of sensory experience. What we typically call ‘memories’ are amalgamated units of many memories. 2 Fundamentally, memories either provide context for understanding the qualities and uses of objects, or they provide context for understanding the subjective experiences which drive human character and dispositions. We collectively invest in education and place value on experience because a greater accumulation of memory correlates to greater understanding of these two realms. Memories appear to exist at varied depths, with some memories only triggered by specific events, while others are recalled readily as they are viewed as defining experiences. 3 Given that the mind has a limited retention capacity, our memories are reduced into a simplified narrative which indicates what is subjectively important. Narratives tend to have clear beginnings and endings, and memories manifest as such out of the mind’s tendency to order the world. A good example of this tendency is that the mind, when listening to randomly repeated tones, will process it as music. 4 Although it would be hard empirically to prove Plato’s theory of Forms, where we understand things through their participating in their ideal form in a separate realm, the essential view that humans experience things as an essence is highly compelling, and is the key reason for this narrative tendency. 5 This narrativization is also a product of the fact that we experience life as a story and carry a narrative of the past based on memory. For example, doctors often perceive their lives as a story about sacrifice in the service of others. As such, we remember things based on their relationship to the narrative: either they conform to it, flout it, or are assimilated by repetition.
Furthermore, we need to untangle what we mean when we say that a memory is false. The problem is that it is exceedingly difficult to define truth. The fact that the Greek word for truth is ‘ ἀ ληθεια’ (not
1 Sebald 1998: 212. 2 For example, the memory of playing French Cricket on a beach combines the memory of the physical exertion, the setting and people. 3 For example, one’s wedding day. 4 Margulis & Simchy-Gross 2016: 509-514. 5 Plato 1954: 159.
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