Memory
forgetting) emphasizes this depth of overlap between truth and memory. There is no clear way to establish a memory as false in the first instance, particularly if we experience it alone. Even when we have an experience alongside other people, they may process it so differently within their narrative that their experience cannot validate ours. Nevertheless, by labelling a memory false we mean that it significantly fails to correlate to the initial experience. We may attempt to prove falsehood through external documentary evidence but this cannot be proven reliable because of its varied interpretations. The final problem we must acknowledge is that even if a memory is experientially true that does not confirm that the experience really occurred. For example, in the case of intoxication memory is not culpable for failure to record a more accurate depiction. When considering the validity of memories, it is more helpful to conceive of a true-false continuum, on which all memories can be evaluated. The first reason why we value the ability to trust our memory is its role in constructing personal identity. The Ship of Theseus paradox may be taken as asking: if we have changed so much since our birth, then how can we prove we are the same person as we were even a few years ago? 6 The most intuitive response is that we are linked to our past self by remembering being them. 7 In this way we can see that our social belief in a consistent personal identity would be questioned to a daunting degree if we view our memories as untrustworthy. The importance of memory to personal identity is demonstrated by the fact that the corroboration of memory is a key reason for the desire for community. Aristotle claimed that man is a ‘social animal’. 8 The most compelling justification for this impulse is that when o ne’s past experiences form a sense of identity, one then requires others to affirm that past. However, it is difficult to untangle our evaluation of the relationship of the self and memory from our specific cultural view which views the brain as the seat of identity and memory. Contrastingly, in the classical world, mental life was more frequently conceptualize d as originating in the ‘wits’ of the gut. For example, in the Iliad , Homer uses the word ‘φρήν’ to describe both the 'midriff', and 'mind'. Thus, the direct connection was not as clear- cut. In even greater contrast, the Buddhist teaching of ‘anatman’ holds that we have no permanent self. 9 Thus, we must recognize that our concern over false memories is partially a by-product of our individualistic society, which emphasizes more the idea of a consistent self to fulfil its narrative about individual value. Memory is also crucial in assuring humans, as ephemeral beings, that they have lived well. 10 Seneca’s vision of a full life whose moments do not slip away wasted is an incredibly powerful consolation as it is based on mortality. 11 This is no consolation if we conclude that actualizing our life depends on accurately recalling our past.
6 Plutarch 1960: 28-29. 7 Locke 1689: 208-209. 8 Aristotle 1962: 55-61. 9 Keown 1996: 51. 10 This realization is beautifully put by Ovid when he describes how ‘Eurydice… uttered no complaint against her husband. What was there to complain of but that she had been loved’. Ovid 1955: 226. 11 Seneca 2005: 4.
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