The Art of Giving a Fatwā in the Ḥanafī Madhhab What follows are reflections about Islamic law, the role of the muftī, and the content and context of a fatwā by Shaykh Amin Kholwadia of Darul Qasim College, Chicago IL. INTRODUCTION: ISLAMIC LAW AND THE ROLE OF A MUFTĪ Islamic law consists of ascertaining Allah’s ﷻ intent, then administering tphraotc ienstseonft at shcreorut ga hi naml ee ng at lasnyds taedmm. iTnhi set roant li yo ni nodfi vAildl auha’ls w h o i s f i t f o r t h i s ﷻ intent is a prophet who is, by definition, Allah’s ﷻ emissary to a people. Everyone else requires a ga uo vt heor nr imt yeins to. If np tahr ea mḤ oa un na ftī ismc hpooor tl aonf cIes liaf mo ni ce l iaswt o, aacpophl ye rIes nl atms yhsot el ims t iocfa l l y a n d cboemy opnrde ht he en smi vi enliym. Wu mh ef on rdsi avlovractei odnf ,r aonmd ict ,eor tnaei ni sl yi ni nc ca appa abbl el eoof fdaopi npgl yai nn gy tthhien g complete intent of Allah ﷻ . Islam is not secular in its essence and Muslims are not secular in their wt hoeri rl davcitei wo nos ri np rt ahci st i cc oe .r pMourselai ml ws oa rr led n, bo ut to anllsyoctohnec oe runt ceodma be so uo tf tt hh ee i or uatcctoi omnes si no f tMhuesHliemrecaofmtemr, ubnoitthy,rienwstairtdutfioorngsoliokde athned punishment for sin. Within the Dār al-Iftāʾ are the systems by which Mh oums lei mmsosrut gbamg iet sl et og aelni dn -qouf i- rl ii fees caabroe uatntdh et hpeerrema fi tsesri br iel icteyi voef ea vreurlyi nt hg i, nogr f r o m fatwā . A
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muftī , or Islamic jurisconsult, takes into account two things in providing a fatwā : that there is no sin ( ithm ), and that there is ease ( taysīr ) in applying the fatwā .The sheer volume of inquiries to the Darul Qasim Dār al-Iftāʾ in the United States is demonstrative of the God-fearing nature ( taqwā ) of American MIf uaslims and the concern they have for their state in both this life and the next. muftī can help a Muslim avoid sin through giving a fatwā , the practice of dispensing a fatwā is of tantamount ontological significance in the religion ( dīn ). However, the work of dispensing a fatwā is not a social competition whereby Muslim scholars ( ʿulamāʾ ) vie to attract inquirers. Their duty is to make the Dār al-Iftāʾ known as an institution in the service of Muslims, but not actively advertise its existence as if it were a commercial enterprise. The Sharīʿah does not oblige them to go out and drag people into the Dār al-Iftāʾ . Ljuikrieswcoisnes,utlhtse.yTdhousn,oatsdiscourage or prevent people from asking other muftīs , their authority ( wilāyah ) as jurisconsults is only over those who come to them with an inquiry. After receiving the fatwā , the petitioner can choose whether or not to spread the word to others that the Dār al-Iftāʾ exists. This way, the freedom of people to ask others—and whether to come to Dār al-Iftāʾ or not—is maintained. Writing a fatwā is a comprehensive skill. It must consider the cultural milieu of a society, an understanding of potential repercussions of the fatwā , and how it could be distorted or exploited. The muftī must weigh how a Muslim sees the fatwā and understands it, then how that Muslim would practice it without misrepresenting Islam or contravening Allah’s ﷻ command.
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The content of a fatwā is based on Islam—a religion whose origins are pMruesml iomd er ur nl e—r swkhniel swt ct hoants itdheeryi nnge et hdee dmroedl iegri no ucso anut et hx to or ift Ay mt oeerni cfao.rHc ei sat onrdi c a l l y , e ( xecute their policies. This is a simple, yet sacred, idea through the example sunnah ) of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ —namely, that governments require pt oe or upllee, ogfokvne or nwal enddgpe rtoodeuncde ol raswe . lCe rgeadl ipboi ll ii tcyy .uCnrdeedri bt hi l ei t ya ui ss pniec cees sos fa ar yMi nu sol ri md e r government is found in the authority of the muftī . Historically, rulers of Islamic civilizations saw the muftī as the highest authority in terms of Islamic ai nf f taei rr sm. Rs uo lf eprus balliwc aoypsi nsiooungahnt dv aplui dbal itci orne,l aj ut isot ni f si ciant itohne, cc or eudr ti bs .i lTi thyi sa nwda ys etchueryi t y coof ua lpdp sr aofveal yl fsraoymt ha artetl hi gei yo uwsearue trhuol ri ni tgy .t hI srl oa umg hw aa ns dt hwu ist hr uI lsi lnagmt hwei tehmtph ee rsotra, ma npd tf lhuex eomf pp oe rl iot irc ws , at hs irsupl ianrga db iagsme doof nc rIesdl ai mb i il ci t yl awwaasnadmn ao itnhsitsa wy . h i m s . A m i d s t t h e This paradigm likewise goes to show that a certain apprehension was pqureessetinotniendthbeyhAellaarhts and minds of rulers with respect to the prospect of being ﷻ about their activities. There was, then, a pietistic db oi srpnoisni tt ioo an torfardui tl ei or ns wt hhaitc hh ai dn floergma lepdr tehceeidr eanctt, i tvhi tei ye sd. iGdi vneont wt haant tr tuol edriss two er tr eo r alter that precedent, as the Qurʾān encourages:
And make unto me a truthful report for later generations (Q 26:84).
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4 ◌ؒ ◌ , also an 8th-century jurist and as cr hg uo al abrlsy at rhoeugnrde ahtiems t, al el lgoa fl wmhi nodmi nc oI solpa emr iact eadn do nMiunsvlei ms t ihg iasttionrgy a, kl ee gpat lamg ar ot tuepr o f before returning the issue to Abū Ḥanīfah ◌ؒ ◌ for the final verdict. The Kūfan legal school that developed from Abū Ḥanīfah’s ◌ؒ ◌ legal practices was one of shūrā . Together as a unit, this group formed the institution of Qāḍī al-Quḍāh . The skills required for an assistant to the Qāḍī al-Quḍāh are best exemplified by the muftī . A muftī is equipped to understand the rulings of his legal school, Thus, Muslim rulers governed through Islamic justification, not merely a mc huani rdoafnteh, es ercuul el ar rbaepl opnr og ea dc hn. oTthteor et hwe ma s, abluwt at yo st ha ec oPnr oc eprhne tf oMr ut hhea md imv iande . T h e ﷺ . This is why the Grand Muftī —known by the title Shaykh al-Islam—was primarily oucncivuepriseadlwjuistthicme.aking sure the ruler was not committing sin on matters of The institution of the Chief Justice ( Qāḍī al-Quḍāh ) was first instantiated and embodied in the first Abbasid judge, Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf ◌ؒ ◌ , an 8th-century ji un rs itsi tt uf trioomn . KHūef ar eiqnupi rr ee ss eansts-ids taaynItrsatqo. Aa i dj uhdigme ci na nr ne soet aurnc ihl ai nt eg r, aa lnl ya lryuzni nagn, a n d imnuvetustailgcaotinnsgualtaptrioobnle(m so that a communal decision can be made based on Shūrā ). And those (believers) who answer the call of their Lord and establish worship, and whose affairs are a matter of counsel, and who spend of what We have bestowed. (Q 42:38) It is well-known that Abū Ḥanīfah
axiomatic principles of jurisprudence, legal theory ( qawāʿid, uṣūl ), and uHni sd terrasitnainndg i nwga tshae vvearryi orui gsi dp ,ossoi tpi oh ni sst ioc fa tt he de laengda li ns ct rhi oc ao tl eo pn rpoac retsi sc :u hl aarv ii snsgu teos . know the legal nuances and idiosyncrasies of the Ḥanafī legal school, why one fatwā may appear to contradict another, and the process of academic review and writing of a fatwā . To do all this, a muftī had to be knowledgeable not just of the Sharīʿah but of worldly matters, including the temperaments of people. It was a noble position respected by all Muslims. TRAINING AS A MUFTĪ: PRIORITIZING JUSTICE ABOVE ALL ELSE In the late 1980s, I trained at Imārat al-Sharī ʿ ah 1 and studied with Qāḍī Mujāhid al-Islām ◌ؒ ◌ . He was, simply, a genius of a legal scholar. He had the mu ni nd edros ft oaotdr .uIen j audr idsitt iwo hn o, huenudnedr setrosot odotdh ea nl adwc ot hnes iwd earye idt Ii ss lma me ai cnltatwo bi ne b o t h a n imn et etrhnea tpi ao rnaal ll eal ns di nl ebgoatlhf rsayms t ee wmos rokf at nh idn skai nwg haonwd ht hoewy Icsol ammp iacr leadw. Hweasshsouwp ee dr i o r tsoe , obtuhte ro fl ei ng at el lsl eycs tt ue ma l st.rMa i yn itnrga iinni nl eggwa li tt hh ehoi rmy . cIown soius tl de ds int oi nt oc fa s“ jeusdagneds hoibps” eprevre tl ahwe :pdr oi vcoerscseo, fi nj uh reirsittiacnccoenasnudl t aptri oo pn e. rMt yo srti gcha tsse. sI nc oI nn cdei ar n, sepde Mc i fui sc lai lml y pi ne rBs iohnaarl, Orissa, and Karnataka, where Muslims choose to have Sharīʿah courts instead of secular courts, the qāḍī in these places could give a ruling and the state would enforce the law. The Hindu state accepted the rulings from these 1 An institution for training Muslim judges near Patna, Bihar, India
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Sharīʿah courts. These Sharīʿah courts were very popular and well-attended; twheerree fsoursep, ipc ri oo up se ro fd tohceu ms eec nu tl aa tr i oc onuorft sc,assiems iwl aar st ov ewr yh ai mt Hp uo sr st ae ni nt . ATghrea mM au shl ai ms s cited in Egypt. Qāḍī Mujāhid ◌ؒ ◌ showed me how documentation was done in the courts, but also how a judge should behave and speak ( ādāb al-qāḍī ). Qāḍī Mujāhid ◌ؒ ◌ also showed me that Islamic law is executed by one principle: justice (ʿadl ). Outside the courts, in his legal writings, he gave pa trti aocrhi tmy et on ta ttoh tehoer eḤt ai cnaal fcī ol engcaelpst ci ohno oolf iḤn ahni sa fpi semr s. oYneat l, dl eegsapl i wt er hi tiisn sgtsr, i hc te bp rr oi nacdi pe nl ee idn ht ihs ea cpopurrotawc ha si nt ot hme ackoeu rs tusr ae nndo sohnoewwe da smwer tohnagtetdh. eF oo pr ehri amt i, vt eh e qāḍī hF oa dr et ox armu lpel ea ,cicfoar dj ui ndgg et or ut hl eedporni nac ippllaeisnot iff fj uusstiincge , orneeg al er dg al el sssc ho of ot hl ,ealnedg ai tl s c h o o l . ai np pa ne ao rt he de rt hl eagt atlhsec hp ol aoi ln wt i fhf ewr eobuyl dt hbee pwl ar oi nntgi fef dw, ho eu lwd onuoltdbfei nwd rao dn igf ef edr ae nn dt rwu loi un lgd ar edvj uo dl ui ct iaot ne aarcyc oa rnddi ndgi f ft eor tehnat t f lreogma l ws chhaot oI l c. oI nf osui dnedr et hdi st hper inoor ri tmi z. aHt ieo en m p h a s i z e d tphoastsaibjlued. ge must broaden his ability to dispense justice in the fairest way 2 This approach enabled him to be pragmatic in the courts. He was, in tuht ii sl i zsienngs eu,nei vmebr os adlyliengga al apxriaogmmaat itci cparpi npcriopal ec hs (w h i c h c o n s i d e r e d c o n t e x t w h i l e uṣūl ).
2 a uAt hqoā rḍiit ywmh oa yi snaoptproeisnotretdt oa st ha i Cs ha ipepf rJ ou as tcihc eu bn yl e tshs ei ts’ st aut ne dweor ut hl de hgauvi de at nh ci se porf etrhoeg Ca thi iveef . JQu ās tḍi icse wa nh do aMrue snl iomt artu tl he ri s l e v e l o f
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When you judge between people, judge with justice (Q 4:58)
ABŪ ḤANĪFAH ◌ؒ ◌ , SHĀH WALĪ-ALLAH ◌ؒ ◌ AND DETERMINING SIN While law must be positivist in its character, it must also have a spirit. Ot hneel aowf t hwea gs rtehaet 1M8ut hs l-icme ntthui rnyk eI nr sd iwa nh op odleymmoant hs t Sr ahtāehd Wt hael īs- pAilrl ai thu a l c h a r a c t e r o f ◌ؒ ◌ . He was arguably one of the most dynamic thinkers in Muslim history. His approach to fiqh was to encourage the scholars of law ( fuqahāʾ ) to be more dynamic in their thinking and writing of the fatwā . Ironically enough, in order to show the fuqahāʾ how to develop the fatwā , Shāh Walī-Allah ◌ؒ ◌ showed a “ pre-fatwā ” or “ pre-madhhab ” position directed towards universal principles. He describes this in his magnum opus , Ḥujjat Allah al-Bālighah , a profoundly multidisciplinary work of philosophical, exegetical and legal thought par excellence . There are some universal precepts and values that are accepted by adlel vcei vl oi lpi zma et inotnos f, bdui ftf et hr eeni rt pc irvaicl itzi caet i oo fntahl ecmo ndvief nf etri os .nTs h. Te arkees ,uflot ro ef xt ha mi s pi sl et ,h e coot hnevresnut isoenbs uf or ira tl .hYe edt i as lpl ohsuaml oafntsh ae ghr ue me tahna tb oa ddye:cSeoa ms eed uhsuemc raenmbaotdi oy nm, auns dt n o t be left on the street. Another example Shāh Walī-Allah ◌ؒ ◌ mentions is satr , or covering of the human body. All humans, to various degrees, cover the body. A
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ca hn idl dwbhoartnt on ac ko evde ri sd si fof oe rn, tbhuet rtehaef tue nr icvl eort shaeldv. aTl hu ee coof nc ov ev ne rt ii on ng st ho ef hboowd yt oe xcios vt se. rA final example mentioned by Shāh Walī-Allah ◌ؒ ◌ is the need for humans to hmaevreelhyousing and cooked food. The presence of such universal values is not mental —as some ancient, modern and contemporary philosophers have argued—but is lived and practiced in the world. For the Muslim, the convention of shared universal civilizational values comes from the Sharīʿah . Hence, every rule of Sharīʿah is natural ( fiṭri ) in that ihtef owl loouwl ds na ahtuumr aal lny lci no emoef ttoh ianckoi nmgp, as ur ac bh l et hcaot ni fc lau ps ieorns ot on ww he ri ceht ot hbee l e f t a l o n e , Sharīʿah has pwraeyscorfibShedāhfoWr ahliīm-A. lMlaahn, ysuccohnatesmQpāorīraṬrayyyscibholarly luminaries thought in the ◌ؒ ◌ 3 , Shaykh Muḥammad Meerān ◌ؒ ◌ 4 and ʿ Allāmah Khālid Maḥmūd ◌ؒ ◌ . 5 Like Shāh Walī-Allah, the aforementioned Ḥanafī ʿulamāʾ were always thinking, analyzing, and re- analyzing.
Islam’s legal coherence is the intellectual gift of the greatest of legal scholars, Imām Abū Ḥanīfah. His genius brought out the coherence of the Sharīʿah . If ever an apparent inconsistency was present, he would comb 3 My mentor at Deoband and arguably the most intelligent Muslim scholar I have ever met 4 My guide and mentor in ṣūfī matters. An incredible mentor, an exceptional guide 5 My mentor in Ḥanafī Law and the Islamic legal theory. He served as a judge at the Pakistan Sharīʿah Court and was a natural genius 6 A tradition from the Prophet Muhammad g narrated by a Successor ◌ؒ ◌ of the Companions j .
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through the Sharīʿah to find ways to bring coherence to it. For example, Abū Ḥanīfah ◌ؒ ◌ recognized that Islam must be practiced by all Muslims at all times. Nbeocwo,mwehienrceodnosiesstetnhte?pArbaūctḤicaenoīffaIhsla◌ؒm remain consistent, and where does it ◌ says Islam can only be practiced cg oo nv es irsnt ae nn ct ley raens du lct os hi ne raenn it nl yc oi nn sMi sut selni mc y l wa nhdesr. eJ uMr ui ssdl ii mc t isomn aoyu tnsoi dt eb eMaubsllei mt o p ( ractice Islam consistently and comprehensively. Take the example of interest ribā ) in Abū Ḥanīfah’s ◌ؒ ◌ thinking. Abū Ḥanīfah ◌ؒ ◌ looks for coherence in the Sharīʿah , and for interest he found a statement of revelation 6 that resolved the i“st shueer ec ri se antoi ni ng tceorne ss itsbt eent wc ye ea nn da cMouhselriemn cayn. aT hneo ns t- aMt ue ms l iemn ti no faMnaoknḥ- Mū lutshlai mt l a n d ” ddoefeisnintoiotnmalecaantethgaotryinotef rinetsetriessntoowr permitted, but more importantly that the ribā laid down by the Sharīʿah does not exist in a non-Muslim society. The prohibition of interest and Abū Ḥanīfah’s ◌ؒ ◌ solution to it in non- MwhuoslidmidsnooctierteiepsriamreanbdotAhbeūstḤaabnliīsfhahed and documented by classical scholars ◌ؒ ◌ for taking this position, even though they disagreed with him. Abū Ḥanīfah ◌ؒ ◌ took revelation as a guiding pwrhi ne cr ei ptl he e, dr ee vi se laopppeadr ea nt th ienocroyhaerroeunnc de oi tr, ai nncdo rnessi sotl ev ne cdyt. eFnrsoi mo n tshi ins Iasnl aa ml y isci sl ,awwe 6 ﻋﻦ اﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ , ﻗﺎل : ﻗﺎل أﺑﻮ ﻳﻮﺳﻒ : إﻧﲈ ﻗﺎل أﺑﻮ ﺣﻨﻴﻔﺔ ﻫﺬا ﻷن ﺑﻌﺾ اﳌﺸﻴﺨﺔ ﺣﺪﺛﻨﺎ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻜﺤﻮل ﻋﻦ رﺳﻮل اﷲ ﺻﲆ اﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ وﺳﻠﻢ أﻧﻪ ﻗﺎل : ﻻ رﺑﺎ ﺑﲔ أﻫﻞ اﳊﺮب I[ mr eāgma r da li -nBgatyhḥea aqbi swe rnoctee ot fh raitbIāmi nā md āarl -aSl h- ḥāaf irʿ bī n] abrercaatuesset hs oa mt Aeboūf Yo ūu sr ut fe ar ec ph oe rr st sr, e" lIamt eā mo nAt bh ūe Ḥa uatnhī of ar hi t yo nolfyMs aa ikdḥ wū lh, na ta rhrea st iani gd Naṣb al-Rāyah -Zaylaʿī (people of variant states).” al -ḥarb ahl al (interest) between ribā said “There is no g t 4 h :5 a 2 t 1 the Prophet
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ce ax ne cpuot es i wt tohualtdabney sI us lsapme ni cdleadwi nt haa tnroenq- uMi ruessl i amgloavnedr na nmde int tsaol balui gt ha ot iroint ywt oo u l d b e lifted. For instance, the laws of ḥudūd (punishments) would not be an oalbsloigfaotliloonwosnuiMt.uTshliums,sAinbūnoḤna-nMīfuashli◌ؒm lands to enact. Other such laws would ◌ facilitated the removal of sin upon Msinusalnimd solfifveirningguandbeertttehrewseayciorcuutminsctaanseceosf. sInindiesewd,hhaetlpa ing Muslims identify muftī does. He isdi ne,nht ief iwe si lwl shaeyt hi teirs tnhoetr ae l il so wa es idn. Ii nf tah emr ae titse nr oa ns di nr, uhlee swai lclcmo radkien gl ilfye. eI fatshyefroer i s Muslims. Another approach of the muftī is to begin as Shāh Walī-Allah ◌ؒ ◌ did with the universal principle of human sanctity ( ḥurmah ). He then must examine secondary principles that are utilitarian, specifically the Māqaṣid al-Sharīʿah , or what the Sharīʿah aims to preserve: dīn (the Islamic religion) , ‘aql (intellect) , naṣab (familial lineage) , nafs (personal dignity) , and māl (wealth). For any fiqh issue, the muftī must make sure he is guided by the Qurʾān. Before he delves into books of fiqh , he must ask: Is there anything in the Qurʾān about tbhei sa?dAmrien itshteerree da ni ny tQhuerfʾ ār anmi c ipnrgi nocf itphlee sa no sr wa eQru? rTʾ āhnuisc, wb eofrol rdev ileowo ktihnagt i nn eae d s t o fatwā text like the ʿ Ālamgīr for a legal answer, the muftī must look into the Qurʾān and sunnah . The book of fiqh is an aid, not a manual of absolute decisions. The fatwā is a highly sophisticated, artful dispensation. Intellectually, it requires that the muftī has access to and familiarity with legal opinions that
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are conventional in the Ḥanafī school ( muftāʾ bihi ) and those that are part of the Ḥanafī school, but are not the convention (non muftāʾ bihi ). There is a necessary human component to the fatwā . All fatāwā are contextual to the pbeetrwsoenenanthdethpeetmitoiomneenrta;nthdetrheefore, there must be a living, organic relationship muftī . The fatwā and its consequences thhuemr eafnosr ewdi toh naoct osni mc eprlny feoxri st th ei ni rt rheel ac tl oi ounds, hbi up twi ni tvho Al vlel alhi v i n g , b r e a t h i n g ﷻ . Unfortunately, many Muslims in positions of community authority fail to practice an organic fatwā -giving process, instead choosing to rely on the convention of the school even if it is potentially deleterious for the inquirer. There is a difference between reading fatāwā and dispensing a fatwā . Since the philosophy of the muftī is to choose the easiest route assuming no sI ni ns ties apdr, ehsee nmt ,uhs et fmi r us ts ta sncoetrrt ea li yn swohl eeltyhoe nr st ihne wc oi lnl vbeenatvi ooni doefdt hwei tḤh aanna f ī s c h o o l . understanding of repercussions (including distortions and misuses) of the fatwā . Islam must be represented in the language of the land where the muftī rl ievseisd eosf . tTh ho isse ilsi vwi nhgy laotc Da lal yr ualnQdatshi ma t Cwohl li ec hg ei ,s wc oe nsseiedke rt eodb teof abme mi l i aa irnws tirt ehatmh e. O u r fatāwā go through an editorial process of review to service the art of fatwā - writing. Our aim is to cultivate God-consciousness ( taqwā ), as we are not a secular institution focusing merely on worldly pragmatics. A muftī ’s job is to ainsctehretaHienrtehaeftperre. sence of sin in an action and, by extension, its consequences
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Reading fatāwā —an exercise in theory—requires an understanding of the foundational legal values of the Ḥanafī madhhab. A muftī does not merely rgeraedatalacteenOtuttroiems-aonldḤiamnpafeīrial edict and dispense the same verdict. One of the muftīs , the Damascene Ibn ʿĀbidīn ◌ؒ ◌ , was a great tj uh ri ni skt es ,r h, teh we oarsedt iyc ni aanmai nc da nj uddagcec oo mf t mh eo 1d 9a tt ihn cge, na ltluwr yh. iLl ei kuenodtehresrt aOntdt oi nmg atnh e moral underpinnings of the law. Muftīs in training will read his Radd Al- Muḥtar —as they should—but may fail to think outside Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s ◌ؒ ◌ Ottoman context. The issue here is that Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s ◌ؒ ◌ fatāwā became convention ( muftāʾ bihi ). This approach ignores the non- muftāʾ bihi which are also within the madhhab , and should also be considered. Recall that the fatwā emerges from a question based on the context of the questioner, so the muftī must look at his question from the questioner's context and outside the context of the muftā bihī . If his context matches the context of the muftāʾ bihi , then the conventional view of the madhhab will ampopsltya. Optthfoerrwhiissec,otnhteepxtettihtrioonuegrhsahnoounld- be directed towards that which is muftāʾ bihi approach, which still operates within the wide boundaries of the madhhab . This choice is the muftī 's pq ur eersot igoantei vret hbreocua ug hs ehhi se jiusrliiscpernusdeedntcoej ubda sgeedt hoen stiht ue a t i o n a n d f a c i l i t a t e t h e madhhab' s principles, which is inclusive of the non- muftāʾ bihi. 7 7 A seasoned muftī would follow this approach in situations that are dire but not as a “habit”
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FIQH AND TAṢAWWUF : ONTOLOGICAL CO-DEPENDENCE Islamic law is, by definition, not secular, as it emanates from the Divine cWohmilme athned.sTchhoeliamrspsopretaankcoefoafnthoins-element of divinity cannot be overstated. Sharʿī realm, this does not make that realm outside the purview of Allah ﷻ . The fact that the mundane world was created by Allah ﷻ makes it a non-secular category. This has always been understood ba ryt iMc uulsal ti emds i, nf r tohme otrhye? eTahr el i et hs te toor yt hi ne vcoolnvteesmmpeorrgairnyg. Bt huet chooswm ioss t (h i s t o b e takwīn ) with the socio-legal-political arrangement of human beings ( tashrīʿ ). This way, cosmological reality becomes marinated in Allah’s ﷻ legal command ( ḥukm ). The ḥukm follows the cosmological reality. This is diagrammatically represented in Figure 1. Unquestionably, the creation and the command belong (solely) to Him (Q 7:54). Once this is understood, the legal theorist must consider how to bring tlahwe t(wdiovrineealcmosmtmogaentdh)e.rA: lHlaehmust merge the cosmos (divine creation) with the ﷻ has the power of creating and the power of creoamlimtieasndarinegi.nTcohreploegraatletdheinotroisat will be able to see how cosmological ḥukm . Consider the Ḥadīth about not wasting
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water even while making wuḍūʾ at the bank of a river. This is deemed wasteful ( isrāf ). The Qurʾān uses the word musrif to describe the excess of certain sins (like homosexuality) because they go against the natural order of the cosmos.
Figure 1 : Legal and cosmological order have Allah ﷻ alone as the source. Another way this framework manifests is through the formulae and prescriptions of the ṣūfī shaykh. It is not a fatwā , but corrective counsel and instruction ( iṣlāḥ and tarbiyah ) under the guidance of a shaykh, by which a sthpeirsitpuiariltausapliarsapnitracannt, rtehfeorm himself. Hence, accommodating the context of ṣūfī shaykh will advise and give counsel by molding fiqh into the context. Beyond the mere fiqh , the legal theorist must see Allah ﷻ in the ḥukm . One does so by seeing which name of Allah ﷻ is associated with the verses about the ḥukm .
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At this point, epistemology must be brought into the discussion. The great Indian scholastic Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī ◌ؒ ◌ , a 19th-century I A n l d la i h an ’s Ḥanafī scholar, observed that many verses of the Qurʾān conclude with ﷻ names. If one were to scan all of the verses of aḥkām , the reader would invariably see that each verse is stamped with Allah’s ﷻ names and attributes. For Mawlānā Qāsim ◌ؒ ◌ , this encounter with divine speech was an instantiation of epistemology; namely, that aḥkām “come out” from the names. If the reader discovers names such as al-Ḥakīm (The All-Wise) , al-Baṣīr (The All-Seeing) , and as-Samīʿ (The All-Hearing), each name will have an effect on the ḥukm . Thus, the scholar in legal theory must create a bridge between the names of Allah ﷻ , which are divine, and the ḥukm of Allah ﷻ , which is applied in the mundane. From this we see that the aḥkām spring from Allah’s ﷻ name, which is a ṣūfī model of the cosmological order. Allah ﷻ is Just and that He ﷻ is not unjust is a theistic reality. In a Ḥadīth Qudsī , the Prophet ﷺ quotes Allah ﷻ : “O my servants! I have forbidden injustice on my Self ﷻ so I have then made it unlawful for you to be unjust. So do not be unjust towards one another.” 8 Here wdierescetelyafrmoumndHaisnenarmuleinTgh(eofJuthste prohibition of injustice) coming down ﷻ . Once this is established, we must develop a tohfemoeryrgwinhgicthhebinds the two together. That theory we have is called the theory takwīn (cosmos) with the Sharīʿah (law). Rules follow and are tethered to cosmological reality. 8 Imam Muslim al-Naysābūrī, Ṣ aḥīḥ Muslim, Ḥadīth #2577
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theAmnsiommpeowrthaanttiisdtehaethidaetacoofmaes from rules and commands but departs from ṣūfī shaykh giving counsel ( naṣīhah ). This advice is not a fatwā , nor is it part of the fatwā tradition. However, a seasoned ṣūfī givinsghaaykh who knows the law will be able to give sincere counsel without fatwā . The intended outcome of this is that the recipient does ss oo mm ee tt hh ii nn gg ww hh ii cc hh , ios nb eotctcearsfioorn ,hmi masyebl fe, floarb ehliesds oc ounl , tarnadr yf ot or ht hi se s a l v a t i o n — fatwā . But the ṣūfī refowrmill(give that dispensation as a prescription for the sake of individual iṣlāḥ ), not for the sake of Sharīʿah . Here, we have the old debate between the ṣūfī and the muftī , where the muftī will claim that the ṣūfī is taking the impermissible and rendering it permissible. The ṣūfī shaykh would retort claiming his advice concerns the recipient’s personal discipline and education ( tarbiyah ). Here are some examples for consideration: 1) Af r iMe nuds lwi mh oi niqs ui ni r ense eadb oouf tt hwaht ef rt hi eenrdhseh isph, obuul dt ims saiimn tualitna nf reioe un sdlsyhoi pp ewniltyh a engaged in ḥarām . From a strictly fatwā point of view, the muftī would likely prohibit this. However, the ṣūfī shaykh may approach the problem fcroommp aa nn oi ot nh es hr ivpi emwa, yt ebl el i na gc ot hned iuni dt itvoi dr eufaolrtmh afto trhtehier i br ehneeefdi cl ei asls f r i e n d . 2) AnoMt huaslvime asneyllos tlhoettremryetainckseotfslaivnidngp.oTrhkeat a convenience store and does ṣūfī shaykh will say, “Stay there for a while until you find another job.” This is a prescription, not a fatwā .
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Here, the ṣūfī shaykh is accommodating the context of his student ( murīd ) and applying a different approach to law, a different standard of behavior. Again, it does not operate as a fatwā , not as fiqh , but under the rubric of advice. There exists another approach to understanding a fatwā and Islamic rc ue rl itnagi ns tphoastt mi s obdaesrend Mo nu sploi ms t ms cohdoel ar rnst—h oaut tgehmt . pTths itsoamp pa ri notaacihn—I sul asme di cbmy o r a l ianntdegwriittyhowuittheovuent tchoennsiedeedrifnogr rAellliaahn’sce on tradition as a source for rulings ﷻ knowledge. In this mode of ti nh ti nr iknisni gc a—l l wy shui cbhj ei cs t bt yo nboo umnedaanr si eus nai nf i de da roer tchoehreerf eo nr et —c ornutl ee xs taurael a t a l l t i m e s , nF oe vr emr ot os t bḤe aunnaifvī esrcshaol il za er sd iinnc rl ue dl ai tni og nt ht oo s, ef oar t i Dn satraunl cQe a, ns iamt uCr oe l ol ergteh, eAcl loashm’ so s . ﷻ dc oi vni tneen wd itshdaot mt h iesr et hi es ga ohvi eg rhneirn mg po rr ianl cmi pul ne .dTa hn ee Mp rui ns lci imp l pe obset hmi no dd eervnei rsyt w i l l rtoultihneg,liatnedraolne should strive to maintain this principle, without adherence ḥukm . For example, regarding the rules of inheritance, the ht hi ga ht ebre cma oursael yporui nccai pn l ei mi sp tahr at tmt ho er er ej us shtoi cuel —d bi ne jtuhsetiirc ee si tni ms oact ii eotny—. Tbhye y c l a i m allocating equal shares to both men and women, we can do away with the ḥukm . Thus, they jettison the rules of distribution that are based on the Qurʾān in favor of what they call the “underpinning” of a higher moral value
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which they claim is justice. The result is prioritizing one’s conception of justice over Allah’s ﷻ justice. In our understanding of Islamic epistemology, Allah ﷻ is at work in ee vp ei srtyetmh iinc gf .r Aa ms oe uwnodr ku ni sdme rusct ahnmd ionrge oafc tchoims ml e aoddsa tt ion tghteh caonnacnl uy soi ot hnetrh, af at rt h i s beyond utilitarian ethics. When one encounters a ḥukm , one must understand how Allah’s ﷻ names and attributes contribute to it, which tpaokset smooudre ur nnids et ,r tsht ae nsdt ai nr tgi nbge ypooni ndt sios csieacl uulnadr earnpdi ncnoinntge. xFt ou ra lt. hFeo r t h e Ḥ a n a f ī , iott ihsedr i svyi ns teeamnsd onf ol anw- c.oTnht ee xi tnutaeln. tTihni so it sh ewrhl ae tg as el ps ya sr taet me ss I ss el aemmisc tl oa wb ef rtoom ut on md earxsitma ni zde t bh ee nuetfiilti tiyn itnh li as wt e fmo rp ohruaml wa no rbledi.nTghs ei ni nttheeni tr omf uI snl da ma ni ec ll ai vwe si ss ot oa s uetnedrenrasltraensdidtehnecdeivinine intent in law such that, if applied, it allows access to Jannah (Paradise). If the difference between the two saylwstaeymsstriusma mp tahtteemr oufnldoanngee.vity and durability, the divine system will
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