or security personnel following them, may not be aware if a race is underway or a horse is nearby and, as Ms Davison's fate demonstrates, would be at risk of very serious harm. 34. The Applicant has invited AR to desist from its plans, and offered a location for a peaceful protest by AR [Starkey (DB/163) §§20-21]. The Applicant has also highlighted the actions it takes to protect the horses' welfare, and drawn attention to criminal offences which may apply to AR's actions. None of this was sufficient to deter AR from its plans to disrupt the Derby, and in the Applicant's submission, an injunction is now a necessary and urgent step. The quia timet test is amply satisfied.
ii. The Applicant is more likely than not to succeed in obtaining afinal injunction
35. The Applicant is more likely than not to succeed in obtaining a final injunction: (i) the Applicant's proprietary rights merit protection under the law of trespass and A1P1, and its statutory rights are entitled to the protection of the Courts; (ii) the restrictions on the Respondents' Convention rights that would ensue from the relief sought are justified to protect the Applicants' said rights and other legitimate aims including public safety and order; and (iii) an injunction is just and convenient. 36. AR's planned disruptions clearly fall within the second category of protests described at paragraph 25 above, which the Court of Appeal (by reference to Strasbourg jurisprudence) held are not at the core of Article11and may more readily be restricted. 37. There is overwhelming justification for restrictions on AR's deliberately disruptive protests, which are required to protect three of the legitimate aims described under Articles 10(2) and 11(2): public safety, the prevention of disorder and crime, and the reputation and rights of others. AR's plans threaten significant risks of injury, mass arrests (as at the Grand National), the diversion of police and security resources
TE- 719
11
Made with FlippingBook interactive PDF creator