modification is introduced and a substantial majority of users and validators consent to the modification, the change is implemented and the network remains uninterrupted. However, if less than a substantial majority of users and validators consent to the proposed modification, and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Avalanche Network, with one group running the pre-modified software and the other running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two versions of AVAX running in parallel, yet lacking interchangeability. In addition to forks, a digital asset may become subject to a similar occurrence known as an “airdrop.” In an airdrop, the promoters of a new digital asset announce to holders of another digital asset that such holders will be entitled to claim a certain amount of the new digital asset, generally for free, based on the fact that they hold such other digital asset. We refer to the right to receive any benefits arising from a fork, airdrop or similar event as an “Incidental Right” and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as “IR Virtual Currency.” With respect to any fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event. As such, shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks, and the Trust is not able to participate in any airdrop. In the event the Sponsor seeks to change the Trust’s policy with respect to Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by NASDAQ seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency in-kind to an agent of the shareholders for resale by such agent. However, there can be no assurance as to whether or when the Sponsor would make such a decision, or when NASDAQ will seek or obtain this approval, if at all. Even if such regulatory approval is sought and obtained, shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks, the Trust may not choose, or be able, to participate in an airdrop, and the timing of receiving any benefits from a fork, airdrop or similar event is uncertain. Any inability to recognize the economic benefit of a hard fork or airdrop could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Coinbase Global serves as the AVAX custodian and prime execution agent for several competing exchange- traded AVAX products, which could adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. The Prime Broker and Custodian are both affiliates of Coinbase Global. As of the date hereof, Coinbase Global is the largest publicly traded digital asset company in the world by market capitalization and is also the largest digital asset custodian in the world by assets under custody. By virtue of its leading market position and capabilities, and the relatively limited number of institutionally-capable providers of digital asset brokerage and custody services, Coinbase Global serves as the AVAX custodian and prime execution agent for several competing exchange-traded AVAX products. Therefore, Coinbase Global plays a critical role in supporting the U.S. spot AVAX exchange- traded product ecosystem, and its size and market share create the risk that Coinbase Global may fail to properly resource its operations to adequately support all such products that use its services, which could harm the Trust, the shareholders and the value of the Shares. If Coinbase Global were to favor the interests of certain products over others, it could result in inadequate attention or comparatively unfavorable commercial terms to less favored products, which could adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares. Certain of the Authorized Participants engaged by the Trust may serve in a similar capacity for several competing exchange-traded AVAX products, if approved, which could adversely affect the arbitrage mechanism, the Trust’s operations, the performance of the Trust and ultimately the value of the Shares. Certain of the Authorized Participants engaged by the Trust may serve in a similar capacity for several competing exchange-traded AVAX products, if approved. As a result, the Authorized Participants may be unable to adequately support all of the exchange-traded AVAX products that use their respective services. This risk may also be exacerbated as a consequence of the price and volatility of AVAX, as well as the amount of AVAX that is required to create or redeem Shares of the Trust. Moreover, the Authorized Participants may choose to facilitate creations and redemptions for competing products rather than for the Trust, including as a result of, among other things, how effectively the arbitrage mechanism of the Trust functions, the liquidity for the Shares, the bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and the costs associated with creating and redeeming Shares of the Trust, in each case relative to competing products. In addition, given the relatively limited number of market participants that could serve as Authorized Participants of the Trust, the Trust may not be able to engage other providers to serve
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