first and most common was to communicate with sources close to the concerned parties, “a commentator who shares the source’s point of view or can provide an analysis close to that of the party in question and his or her ideas and opinions” (1) . In Yemen, for example, the majority of the conflicting parties boycotted Al Jazeera. Its reporters were even prevented from working with their explicit identities, “However, the Network found alternative sources, such as activists in the field, citizen journalists, government sources such as ministers and persons close to the presidency, the Houthis, and the southern leaders working with the Saudi-Emirati alliance” (2) . The diversity of Yemeni sources made it pos- sible for Al Jazeera to provide an outstanding coverage of the war in Ye- men, and achieve a score of scoops (3) . Reflecting on his experience with AJE, Ahelbarra observes, “With Al Jazeera’s commitment to neutrality and credibility in covering various events, its boycotters always came back one way or another. One of their well-known tactics is to say, ‘this news is true, but you can attribute it to a vague general source or to po- litical actors that are not as high in the political ranking” (4) . Conclusion Just as CNN triggered a shift in the viewer’s relationship with TV coverage, after the second Gulf War, Al Jazeera brought about a shift in the relationship between Arab viewers and the events taking place around them. In this context, Miles believes that Al Jazeera’s cover- age of the second Palestinian Intifada had an indelible impact on its viewers’ outlook, making them mindful of the real-time occurrence of events. He likened what Al Jazeera did in Palestine to what American
(1) Abu Hilala, personal interview, Ibid.
(2) Ashalafi, Ibid.
(3) Ashalfi cites 8 news items that Al Jazeera broadcast before all other news channels from 2011 to 2020. These include news of the resignation of Yemeni president after the Houthis stormed his residence in January 2014, his escape a month later, and the entry of the Emirati forces into Aden in May 2015 despite the denial of the Saudi-Emirati alliance. In 2016, Al Ja- zeera broadcast several exclusive recordings of Saleh, in which he incited and coordinated with the Houthis to storm Sanaa.
(4) Ahelbarra, personal interview, Ibid.
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