Ultra-Orthodox protesters dance while holding a sign reading “The people of Israel do not have a right to exist without Torah,” Route 4 near Bnei Brak, March 4, 2024.
We find ourselves in the most serious national crisis since the founding of the state in 1948. It cannot and should not be airbrushed. It is real. And, yes, it is dire. Israelis speak of their relationship with the state as a “contract.” Throughout the last year of social unrest, when many Israelis protested the sweeping judicial and institutional reforms proposed by the coalition government, many said that we need a new contract with the state. The existing contract is predicated on the agreement of citizens to serve in the military to secure a liberal, democratic state with a Jewish majority. In return, based on the wording of the Declaration of Independence, as well as 75 years of national culture, the state must support institutions that are democratic. Often misunderstood in Diaspora com-
scoff at the detailed intelligence reports made by the female soldiers for well over a year? Why was one female officer threat- ened with a court martial if she persisted in expressing alarm at what her soldiers were reporting? Why was a report—obtained by IDF military intelligence at least a year before Oct. 7—which detailed a planned attack against Israel dismissed as the fantasies of Hamas punks? Why did every aspect of Israel’s defence infrastructure and capability fail its citizens living in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip? Why did the IDF deploy masses of troops in the West Bank in the days leading up to Oct. 7 and leave the Gaza area complete- ly exposed? Why did it take eight hours, minimum, from the launch of the attack, for the IDF to show up? And why was the air force nowhere in sight? Why did it take three weeks for the IDF to get boots on the ground, meaning that any possibility to “shock and awe” Hamas and rescue hos- tages was squandered? Imagine, if you dare, the fury of Eyal Eshel. Israelis revere the IDF. “The people’s army,” they call it. The military is the great equalizer in society, a true meritocracy. At least, that was the myth that we all believed.
munities, the protest movement was not a bunch of leftist, anarchist rogues. Not by a longshot. It reflected the diversity of Israeli society, socially, economically, and politically, but with one exception. It did not include the ultra-Orthodox, or haredim, who comprise 14 percent of the current popula- tion of 9 million. Since the founding of the state, haredi men have been granted an exemption from serving in the military. In return, they are free to dedicate their lives to the study of Torah until age 26. The state fully supports them and their large families. When they turn 27 and are required to work to earn a living, they are unqualified to do much, having had a rudimentary secular education. Many take menial jobs and continue to study, relying on the largesse of foreign donors. This “arrangement” came about in the weeks before the state was declared by prime minister David Ben Gurion. Haredim were threatening to oppose the establish- ment of a secular state before the United Nations. In their eyes, only God could restore statehood for the Jews. Ben Gurion faced a very practical conun- drum. He had to stifle haredi dissent and present a unified voice before the global
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