Obedience and freedom
his introduction of eros and thanatos in the very same text seems to undermine this claim as he highlights, as Zizek later drove home, that we do not really know what we want. This is because we are animated constantly by the desire for the culmination of our goal embodied by thanatos (‘death’) and yet we find the struggle towards this goal eros (‘desire’) more fulfilling than the achievement itself. This is likely because evolution has set us up to appreciate the hunting and gathering more than the actual victory in order to overcome the fatigue and physical displeasure inherent in its dangers and exertions. Nevertheless, the process of searching for food is what animates this search. Perhaps, Freud actually is being consistent as he is also showing we do not know what we want through the internal conflict between ego and id. Thus there is, through a metaphorical simplification, at least a double tension operating when we desire something, scuppering the sense of consistent desire. This complicates the situation profoundly as when we say ‘freedom’ we so often mean the freedom to do what you want, yet it is clear that at worst we do not know what we want at all, or at best that parts of ourself are internally contradictory when it comes to desire. This explains the dissatisfaction of the constant push and pull between freedom and social restriction. We have desperately sought to get the balance right for generations, but we are always dissatisfied. The idea that freedom is the fulfilment of desire is further complicated by the idea of self-restraint, the delaying of gratification seems to be a very important motivator in shaping human actions. Indeed, we ironically often gain a lot of satisfaction from exerting control over our desires. The ability to imagine a future self that will suffer means, for example, that though part of us desires to eat all our food straight away, which would seem to match Freud’s vision of the freedom of the id, we are made more free in terms of the amount of control we have over our own lives by self-restraint. The truis m of ‘all things in moderation’ here captures something crucial. We ultimately feel more free when we actually say ‘ no ’ to id desires, saying ‘ no ’ to using our phone too much, to drinking too much, to spending too much money. I think that the solution to the problem of not knowing sincerely what we want is a kind of recognition of the importance of desires that seem at surface level to be arbitrary. It is crucial to lean into the things that give you passion and enjoyment though you cannot explain it. To some extent, it ’ s about the fact that we are hard-wired to make arbitrary, ‘gut instinct’ choices to avoid indecision . For example, when a tortoise is presented with three perfectly good leaves, they are wired to choose one rather than being paralysed and refusing to eat as it is impossible to judge any palpable differences rationally. Leaning into your arbitrary or inexplicable passions and interests, for example, the history of the Bakerloo line, or the migratory patterns of European eels, would seem to be the most freeing thing to do. These things matter to you in some sense because they define you and your desires rather than anyone else’s. And let us not sneer at arbitrary relationships. The relationship between a father and his child are ultimately arbitrary, of all the sperm cells that could have participated in making the baby it was his sperm, and a very specific, ultimately extremely ‘lucky’ one of his that ‘won the race’. However, we would not say for a moment that just because the process that led to the creation of that child was largely random that no emotional attachments or moral duties follow. The relationship between parents and children further highlights the importance of what I am arguing about freedom often coming from the desire for arbitrary things. There is a degree of necessary selfishness involved, but a selfishness that feels good and right, that though your relationship to the things you desire may be random they are unique to you. Many parents would let thousands of people die in a trolley problem scenario to save their child. Indeed, choosing to care for your child rather than anyone else’s is ultimately selfish. I do not think this can be said to be a morally bad decision to make, given the unique relationship between parent and child that everyone can sympathize with and the way evolution has wired us to find parenthood rewarding. The same is
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