Semantron 24 Summer 2024

The Windsor Framework

labelling on all products UK-wide, rather than distinguish between goods that will be shipped to NI and goods that will remain in mainland Britain as this would be a mammoth task. This means increased costs UK-wide (and possibly firms withdrawing from selling goods in NI altogether). Thus, there is uncertainty over whether the Framework will even deliver a net freeing of trade between Britain and NI; as during the time in which the NI protocol was supposed to have been in full operation, many checks were simply not occurring due to political sensitivities and capacity limitations, whilst the new onerous labelling requirements and checks will undoubtedly depress GB-NI trade, meaning there may not even be a noticeable difference from the era of the Protocol compared to now. What is more, the 3% of EU rules that remain in effect in NI, mean that British and Northern Irish consumers are not 'on the same footing in respect of trade'. Crucially, such an imbalance is not compatible with Article 6 of the Act of Union, which was number 1 on the DUP's list of 7 tests. This means that the Framework falls at the first hurdle as well as almost all of the following 6! Altogether then, it is unsurprising that in Westminster, the DUP voted against one of the key WF mechanisms: the Stormont Brake, which claimed to reduce the 'democratic deficit' in Northern Ireland and tackle test number 4 - to 'give the people of NI a say in making laws that govern them'. The reality is that the Brake would be very ineffective in practice, with its terms being subjective and hard to meet, and the Brake being used only in 'the most exceptional circumstances and as a last resort, having used every other available mechanism’. And even if these terms were met, then it is doubtful that the UK government would be inclined to use the Brake, as - in the event that it is used and 'regulatory divergence between NI and the EU occurs' - then the EU reserves the right to retaliate with 'appropriate remedial measures'. With no real idea of what 'appropriate' means to the EU, the UK government would be very reluctant to let events develop to that stage. So, in conclusion, the Northern Ireland Protocol has been problematic for the DUP from the start, and - despite the initial optimism which accompanied its announcement - the Windsor Framework which succeeded it has done little to alleviate many of these concerns. And the future for the Northern Ireland Assembly looks scarcely any more positive. Sir Jeffrey Donaldson remains firm on his stance that ‘ any return to fully-functioning devolved institutions at Stormont without further progress, including legislation that restores our place in the United Kingdom and its internal market, would be a retrograde step in our efforts to build a Northern Ireland where every tradition is respected and where there is economic opportunity for everyone everywhere. ’ It seems unlikely therefore that Stormont will reconvene any time soon: considering both Rishi Sunak and the EU are reluctant to change the terms of the agreement as they see it as the best possible solution to the Northern Irish problem. Whilst Donaldson argues that there is no need for a deal anywhere near as restrictive as the Framework, since a majority of the trade from Britain to Northern Ireland stays within Northern Ireland, and thus, 'There is a negligible risk to the integrity of the EU market. Indeed, it is hard to find a single reported case of goods crossing the border since 2020 which have been a threat to their Irish and EU consumers - despite many EU rules not having been applied ’ . This means the two sides are at a stalemate, with neither likely to budge. And for the future of the Northern Irish economy, with Stormont unlikely to return, it may risk missing out on billions of dollars in US investment, after Joe Biden spoke to NI party leaders in April, he stated that American investors were ready to ‘ triple ’ the $2bn already invested in Northern Ireland in the past decade. However, the executive director of British American Business, Emanuel Adam, said that this sounded like a ‘ magic figure ’ unless Biden ‘knows something we don’t.’ One DUP official said that U.S.

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