Personal identity
Since then, the principal argument has been between the various physical and neo-Lockean (or ‘psychological’) criteria. Williams defends the former though his insistence on bodily continuity as a necessary condition of personal identity; Shoemaker defends the latter, holding psychological continuity as the paramount relation. Wiggins, who argues that identity consists in the continued existence of the brain, also plays a key role in contemporary discussion. Nonetheless, as with the bodily and psychological criteria, the brain is not without its problems. One agreement between all these philosophers is that, because identity is a one-one relation and what matters in survival, in the ordinary case, you are in all senses the same person today as when you were ten. However, in Personal Identity (1971) and Reasons and Persons (1984), Derek Parfit argues against this. He contends both that what matters in survival is not personal identity, and what does matter (psychological continuity and connectedness) is not a one-one relation. Parfit’s thesis suggests that whether you are the same person today as when ‘you’ were ten is a matter of degree. In Part Three of Reasons and Persons , Parfit uses various hypothetical cases to challenge these notions. Stating that personal identity consists in ‘non - branching psychological continuity and connectedness’, he uses examples proposed originally as objections to the psychological criterion, such as Williams’ ‘Psychological Spectrum’, 7 Wiggins’ ‘fission’ case, 8 and Williams’ ‘Guy Fawkes’ 9 objection, to argue both that personal identity can be indeterminate and is not what matters in survival. What does matter can take a branching form. One of these relations is psychological connectedness and holds at least as much importance in survival as the other, psychological continuity. The consequence is that, because connectedness is a non-transitive relation and is a matter of degree (different numbers of connections can hold from moment to moment), survival is also a matter of degree. (Psychological continuity entails psychological connectedness but not vice-versa.)
Parfit would say that if you hold few psychological connections with your ten-year-old self, present you is not very much the same person as ten-year- old ‘you’ in the way that matters. This is the thesis I will defend.
Shoemaker is a staunch defender of a neo-Lockean theory of personal identity, where psychological continuity is the necessary and sufficient condition. It is important to note that, unlike memory continuity, psychological continuity involves overlapping chains of psychological connections other than just memory connections, such as aspects of one’s personality, and one’s intentions and ambitions. The consequence is that in cases of amnesia or other losses of particular psychological connections, identity is preserved. 10 So, unless your brain is tampered with, or you lose psychological continuity through having a complete change in character and loss of memories in a moment of unconsciousness, you will be the same person as when you were ten in all senses. 11
7 Williams 1970. The term ‘psychological spectrum’ is Parfit’s for Williams’ objection. 8 Wiggins 1967. 9 Williams 1956-1957. 10 For further explanation, see ‘Personal Identity, A Materialist’s Account’ in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984. 11 It would have to be in ‘all senses’ since personal identity is a one -one condition.
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